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Military strategists expect U.S. forces to be involved in an increasing number 
of regional contingency operations of the sort conducted in Somalia from 1992 until 
1994. The success of such large-scale humanitarian missions hinges on effective 
logistical operations, especially sealift. Planners of future missions, therefore, would 
greatly profit from the study of maritime operations during the intervention in 
Somalia. 
This thesis thus provides a thorough chronology of events surrounding seaport 
operations at Mogadishu, Somalia. The work furthermore analyzes related logistical 
issues and problems in order to identify lessons learned from the expedition. 
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The following is a case study of U.S. sealift and force sustainment operations at 
Mogadishu supporting the United Nations military intervention in Somalia from December 
1992 until March 1994. The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the logistical plans, 
decisions, and actions of participating U.S. commanders. A comprehensive chronology of 
significant events relating to operational logistics is provided. Attention focuses on the 
development and resolution of administrative, transportation, material handling, and security 
problems from the perspective of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Such analysis is 
intended to identify lessons learned and produce recommendations useful for conducting 
similar future evolutions. 
This chapter provides a brief history of the Somalia operation and establishes the 
significance of studying it from a logistician's perspective. It further discusses the scope, 
method, and intended application of the study. 
A. SOMALIA INTERVENTION BACKGROUND: THE POLITICAL AND 
MILITARY CONTEXT 
In order to properly evaluate the logistical operations at Mogadishu, it is important 
to first understand the political and military context in which they occurred. Basic 
knowledge of history surrounding the U.N. intervention in Somalia is therefore required. 
Such historical background demonstrates how careful analysis of Mogadishu seaborne 
operations is particularly significant. 
The crisis which compelled the U.S. and the world to intervene in East Africa might 
well have been predicted as early as 1960 when Somalia gained independence. 
Approximately the size of New England, the new republic was the arbitrary union of British 
Somaliland in the North and Italian Somalia in the South. The country's 6.7 million citizens, 
factionalized into numerous tribes, populate a region long plagued by severe drought. [Ref. 
1: p. 6] All the elements for chaos in the Hom of Africa were present for decades and merely 
awaited some political catalyst. 
In 1991, the government of General Mohammed Siad Barre collapsed after a 
disastrous war with Ethiopia and subsequent revolt of political rivals. Barre fled Somalia, 
and a bloody civil war quickly ensued between government loyalists and a multitude of 
contentious clans. The combined effects of tribal warfare, disease, and famine resulted in 
over 300,000 deaths by the summer of 1992. Furthermore, some 4.5 million Somalis were 
starving, and 800,000 were taking refuge in neighboring states such as Kenya. Government 
offices, the military, and constabularies disappeared. Most economic institutions likewise 
perished. Competing rival chieftains, or warlords, provided the only remaining authority in 
Somalia. [Ref. 1 :p. 7] 
Alarmed by the extent of the tragedy in East Africa, U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-
Ghali inspired a series of Security Council resolutions intended to restore order. In January 
1992, the council imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Somali combatants by passing 
Resolution 733. Ghali's leadership further prompted the passage of Security Council 
Resolution 751 on 24 April 1992. The most noteworthy of the crisis, this resolution 
committed the U.N. to the peacekeeping and humanitarian operation known as UNOSOM. 
The operation was to be supervised by the Secretary General and directed by the U.N. 
Special Representative to Somalia. Fifty observers were to maintain a cease-fire in 
Mogadishu, and a security force of five hundred men was to safeguard the delivery of 
humanitarian supplies. [Ref. 1 :p. 9] 
This initial U.N. effort, however, suffered from poor planning, inadequate material 
support, and embarrassing delays. UNOSOM observers did not arrive on scene until23 July 
1992, and the security force was delayed until 12 August when a leading warlord, 
Mohammed Farah Aideed, finally granted his consent. As much as ninety percent of food 
and other humanitarian supplies were being diverted to armed gangs as tribute for protection 
of relief convoys and warehouses. On 28 August 1992, the Security Council resolved to 
send an additional 3,500 U.N. troops to secure relief efforts. By year's end, however, the 
contingent had not yet arrived. [Ref. 1 :pp. 9-1 0] Clearly the UNOSOM effort lacked the 
necessary resolve and resources of a military superpower. 
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Pressed by emotional media reports, public sentiment, and the prospect ofUNOSOM 
failure, President George Bush could no longer resist U.S. intervention in East Africa. He 
and his successor, Bill Clinton, would escalate America's involvement in three distinct 
phases (Table 1): 
1. Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM I), 
2. Operation Restore Hope (UNIT AF), and 
3. USFORSOM (UNOSOM II) [Ref. 2:p. 15]. 
Operation Dates UN Security u.s. 
Councn Commander 
Resolution 
Provide Relief 15Aug UNSCR# (HAST-then 
(UNOSOM I) 1992- 751 JTF) 
9 Dec dtd 24 Apr BG Frank 
.. 
1992 1992 Libutti, 
USMC 
Restore Hope 9 Dec UNSCR# LTG Robert 
(UNITAF) 1992- 794 B. Johnston, 
4May dtd 3 Dec USMC 
1993 1992 
USFORSOM 4May UNSCR# MGThomas 
(UNOSOM II) 1993- 814 M. 
31 Mar dtd 26 Mar Montgomery, 
1994 1993 USA 
Table 1. Operational Phases of the Somalia Intervention [Ref. 2] 
Extensive military resources were to be applied in the largest expedition since the Gulf War. 
The mission of U.S. forces, however, was to be initially limited. The expedition was to 
establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, ensure the unmolested distribution of 
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humanitarian supplies, and complete an orderly transfer of control back to the U.N. [Ref. 
1: p. 11] 
1. UNOSOM I (Operation Provide Relief) 
Operation Provide Relief, the U.S. contribution to UNOSOM, was initiated on 15 
August 1992 and lasted until early December. During such time, the U.S. Central Command, 
or CENTCOM, accomplished three principal objectives. First, it deployed a Humanitarian 
Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to ascertain relief requirements in Northern Kenya and 
Somalia. Second, it established the Joint Task Force (JTF) which conducted the airlift of 
emergency supplies to the region. Finally, CENTCOM deployed C-141 and C-130 aircraft 
to Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya to fly daily relief sorties to secure locations in Somalia. 
Provide Relief air operations eventually delivered 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies. 
Twenty sorties carrying 150 metric tons was the daily average. Nevertheless, deteriorating 
security in Somalia forced an end to this initial phase.v [Ref. 2:pp. 14-15] 
2. UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope) 
When a U.N.-charter relief ship was fired upon in Mogadishu harbor in November, 
the utility of military occupation became obvious. Under the authority of Security Council 
Resolution 794, President Bush announced the commencement of Operation Restore Hope 
on 4 December 1992. The U.S. would lead and provide the dominant military component 
of the United Task Force (UNITAF), a multinational coalition security force, according to 
the terms of the resolution. [Ref. 2:p. 16] The U.N. mandate tasked UNITAF to (1) provide 
humanitarian relief and (2) enforce the peace in southern Somalia with "whatever force 
necessary" as per Chapter VII of the resolution [Ref. 1 :p. 11]. The U.S. thus committed itself 
to a mission requiring extensive sealift and airlift, complex logistical planning and 
coordination, and many unforeseen risks. 
CENTCOM developed the concept of operations for the expedition and established 
four objectives for UNITAF. These objectives were to be accomplished in four correspond-
ing phases: 
1. Introduction of Forces. Major airports, seaports, key installations, and food 
distribution points were to be secured [Ref. 3:p. 4]. 
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2. Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). Eight sectors were to be established and 
assigned to coalition units. Security was to be assured for relief convoys and 
distribution points in each sector. 
3. Stabilization. Sufficient time was to be allowed for relief operations to take 
effect. Planning for the transition back to U.N. control was to be conducted. 
4. Transition to UNOSOM II and Redeployment. UNITAF was to retain 
control of each HRS until a secure transfer to U.N. forces could be 
completed. U.S. and coalition forces would redeploy upon relief. 
Operation Restore Hope would proceed as the situation dictated, not according to an 
established time line. [Ref. 1 :pp. 11-14] 
Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, was appointed commander of the 
U.S. Joint Task Force and, as such, the coalition commander. U.S. forces under his 
command included the 16,000 men of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) at 
Camp Pendleton and 10,000 soldiers of the Army's Tenth Mountain Division at Fort Drum. 
The Air Force contributed one C-130 tactical airlift squadron and 600 men. Furthermore the 
Navy deployed one carrier battle group, a three-ship amphibious task unit (ATU), and ships 
of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron Two (MPSRON-2) based at Diego Garcia. 
[Ref. 3:p. 4] 
The first phase of Operation Restore Hope began at 0500 hours on 9 December 1992 
with the landing of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) at Mogadishu. The unit occupied 
both the seaport and airport without opposition. The port of Kismayu and the airstrip at 
Bardera was later seized by the MEU. Four other inland airstrips were also taken by 
coalition forces. [Ref. 3 :pp. 9-1 0] The considerably more difficult tasks of deploying, 
provisioning, and redeploying the bulk of coalition forces, however, preoccupied operation 
commanders for several months. 
U.S. sealift and airlift operations reached their zenith during Operation Restore Hope. 
In total, over 38,000 troops from twenty-one nations were deployed during this phase, 28,000 
of whom were Americans [Ref. 2:p. 17]. When officially succeeded by UNOSOM II in 
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May 1993, the operation covered all of southern Somalia, forty percent of the country and 
the area hardest hit by famine [Ref. 1 :p. 14] 
In contrast to UNOSOM I, Operation Restore Hope met all CENTCOM objectives 
due to superior planning and resources. By confiscating vehicle-mounted weapons from 
locals, coalition forces vastly improved security. As a result, relief supply distribution 
proceeded without significant interruption, and the prospects for the Somali population 
improved markedly. With the immediate threat of mass starvation diminished, U.S. 
commanders looked to an orderly transition to U.N. control of operations. [Ref. 2:p. 17] 
3. UNOSOMII 
The transition, however, was not smooth. The U.N. Secretary General, reluctant to 
assume responsibilities in Somalia until U.S. forces could disarm the warring clans, urged 
UNOSOM Il's delay [Ref. 2:p. 18]. The U.N. now planned an ambitious "nation-building" 
program for Somalia: a factional reconciliation process, economic reconstruction, and 
reestablishment of local police forces. The U.N. was hesitant to reduce force size given 
continued sporadic violence in Somalia, a possible threat to its expanded mission. [Ref. 4:p. 
6] 
Nevertheless, the U.N. Secretary General finally proposed a concept of operations 
on 3 March 1993 based on strategy recommended by the U.S. State Department and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. The Security Council accepted this proposal and authorized the UNOSOM 
II peace enforcement operation on 26 March. 
Like the preceding operation, the UNOSOM II would evolve in four phases: 
1. Transfer of Control. U.S.-led forces were to be relieved by U.N. units once 
a secure environment in each relief sector was achieved. 
2. Security Consolidation and Expansion. Somali government institutions and 
infrastructure were to be rehabilitated. 
3. Transition to Civilian Control. Legitimate Somali authority was to be 
restored as political institutions were reconstructed. 
4. Redeployment of Forces. UNOSOM II would conclude once the Somali 
government was sufficiently stable. [Ref. 1 :p. 15] 
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Operations were to extend to Somaliland despite the region's untimely declaration of 
independence [Ref. 2:p. 18]. The U.N., with the backing of the newly-installed Clinton 
Administration, thus resolved to go well beyond the its original humanitarian mission. 
UNOSOM plans called for the deployment of 20,000 U.N. combat troops and an 
additional 8,000 logistical support personnel. Special Representative to the Secretary 
General, U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, would lead the effort with Turkish Lieutenant 
General Bir as commander of the U.N. multinational force. [Ref. 4:p. 6] A U.S. contingent 
of 3,000 personnel would participate principally to provide logistical support for the 
operation [Ref. 2:p. 18]. As insurance, the U.S. would also maintain a Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) commanded by Bir's deputy, U.S. Major General Thomas Montgomery. Some 1,300 
combat troops of the QRF could be deployed in the event of sudden hostilities. [Ref. 5 :p. 
17] 
On 4 May 1993, the U.S. relinquished control of operations in Somalia to the 
UNOSOM II force commander. Although military sealift requirements for the U.S. were 
diminished with the end of Operation Restore Hope, logistical requirements remained 
daunting. The U.S. still shouldered considerable force sustainment responsibilities for the 
eleven months ofUNOSOM II. [Ref. 2:pp. 19-20] 
UNOSOM II failed to restore stability in Somalia. The U.N.'s ambitious attempt to 
reconstruct the country's political institutions ultimately caused native resentment and 
outright hostility. Threatened by the U.N. regime, clan leader Mohammed Aideed inspired 
attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. Twenty-four troops of the Pakistani contingent were killed 
in an ambush on 5 June 1993. In retaliation, the Security Council passed a resolution 
demanding "the arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment" of the Somali 
assailants- namely Aideed. The U.S. deployed four hundred troops of its Joint Task Force 
Ranger under the command of Major General William Garrison to apprehend Aideed. [Ref. 
5 :p. 17] UNOSOM II became consequently entangled in the Somali political quagmire from 
which it could not be extricated. 
The collapse of UNOSOM II came after a series of raids conducted by Joint Task 
Force Ranger beginning on 24 August. During the seventh and final raid on 3 and 4 October, 
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U.S. forces engaged in bitter skirmishes with Somali clansmen, presumably Aideed 
supporters. Eighteen Americans were killed in action with eighty-four wounded. [Ref. 5:p. 
17] The incident sparked criticism of U.S. foreign policy and prompted the President 
Clinton to announce a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. The Somalia 
expedition for U.S. forces came to an ignominious end on 31 March 1994. [Ref. 2:p. 20] 
Conditions governing the conduct of sealift operations at Mogadishu in 1992 and 
1993 contrasted sharply with those prevailing during Operation Desert Storm. In the winter 
of 1991, the Persian Gulf allies of the U.S. provided well-managed, modem port facilities 
safe distances from the scene of combat. Cargo delivered by allied charters was 
predominantly war material for use against the Iraqi armed forces. Conversely, Somalia 
lacked any recognizable civil authority or suitable port infrastructure. Mogadishu was also 
susceptible to frequent civil unrest which challenged port security. Further complicating 
logistics management, Operation Restore Hope involved the transport and handling of both 
war material and humanitarian supplies. Nevertheless, the latter expedition did benefit from 
the experience gained during the former. The operation in Somalia, of course, was less an 
emergency to participating forces and smaller in scale. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A thorough study of logistical operations during Operation Restore Hope and 
UNOSOM II is important because occasions to conduct similar operations under similar 
circumstances are likely to be more frequent. With the demise of the Soviet Union and 
subsequent end ofthe Cold War, a consensus has emerged among military strategists: (1) 
that U.S. forces should be prepared for "low-intensity engagements" and "operations other 
than war" and (2) that operations in the world's littoral regions will grow in frequency and 
importance. These predictions are prominently reflected in the President's National Security 
Strategy and National Military Strategy of the United States produced by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. The desperate conditions in Somalia appear to support the predictions. It is an 
archetypical case that strategists envision in the post-Cold War era: a Third World political 
crisis requiring multinational intervention to suppress hostilities and provide humanitarian 
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assistance. [Refs. 6 and 7] Operation Restore Hope is therefore a convenient model, the 
analysis of which may be applied recurrently in similar operations. 
UNIT AF and UNOSOM logistics, particularly sealift operations, should be especially 
well scrutinized. The demands on U.S. armed forces created by the new global political 
regime imply greater reliance on strategic sealift to project and sustain U.S. power abroad. 
Diminished U.S. presence overseas intensifies this reliance. [Ref. 7:p. 24] Operation 
Restore Hope is the case in point, foreshadowing an expanded role for U.S. sealift assets. 
Strategic planners, therefore, should have some insight into the operation from a 
transportation perspective. 
This thesis thus serves to fill a significant gap in the analysis of the Restore Hope and 
UNOSOM II operations. Literature concerning the diplomatic and tactical dimensions of the 
intervention in Somalia is voluminous. Unfortunately, however, considerably less attention 
has been paid to the logistical aspects of an expedition largely dependent on effective 
seaborne transportation management. Although the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force 
have published a few accounts of their logistics operations in Somalia, less such material 
exists for the Navy's benefit. Given the importance of sealift to the Somalia operations and 
future U.S. military strategy, a history of the expedition from a Navy perspective is required. 
C. RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHOD 
This case study is confmed primarily to Military Sealift Command (MSC) operations 
. ':l'•'-~ .. A._ 
during the Restore Hope and UNOSOM II operations from December 1992 uilt11 March 
1994. Particular emphasis is placed on the decisions and activities of local commanders. 
The activities of other units - such as the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) -
including airlift and combat operations are discussed as they relate to sealift operations. 
The thesis details events at the Mogadishu port facility to appraise the decisions of 
local Navy commanders as well as MSC plans and policy. This includes the following: 
1. The identification of key players within the MSC and their respective roles 
in managing sealift and force sustainment operations (Chapter II); 
9 
2. A description of interrelationships between MSC and units with stakes in 
sealift operations, particularly other logistics commands (Chapter II); 
3. A complete chronology of significant events impacting sealift and 
sustainment operations during Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II 
(Chapter II); 
4. An analysis of important issues affecting operational logistics at Mogadishu 
including problems with planning, port control, sealift and sustainment, con-
tracting, and security (Chapter III); 
5. An assessment of the effectiveness of sealift and sustainment operations and 
how well logistical problems were resolved (Chapter III); 
6. The identification of lessons learned about the conduct of sealift and sus-
tainment operations (Chapter IV); and 
7. A set of recommendations applicable to operations similar to the one 
conducted at Mogadishu (Chapter IV). 
Based on the experience of local MSC decision-makers, the thesis draws conclusions about 
broader transportation management issues. 
Research data about the Mogadishu sealift operations were gathered from the 
following sources: 
1. Published studies and accounts including testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, documents of the Naval War College and 
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and works of the Rand Corporation and 
Institute for National Strategic Studies; 
2. Statements of naval officers who participated at the scene of operations; 
3. Interviews with knowledgeable personnel of the MSC. 
Thesis conclusions represent some of the opinions advanced by these sources. 
D. RESEARCH APPLICATION 
The U.S. Navy and MSC, in particular, are the intended primary beneficiaries of this 
study. Naval strategic planners may be able to apply the lessons learned and recommenda-
tions from the thesis in order to improve future sealift and force sustainment operations 
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similar to Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II. By recording the successes and failures 
of the MSC in Somalia, the nation may be able to more effectively project its influence from 
the sea in response to an environment of increasing global uncertainty. 
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II. CHRONOLOGY OF MOGADISHU PORT OPERATIONS 
A proper understanding of Mogadishu port logistical issues requires knowledge of 
the pertinent events surrounding the operation. This chapter therefore provides a thorough 
chronology of port operations beginning with Central Command (CENTCOM) crisis action 
planning and ending with the final withdrawal of U.S. ground forces and MSC ships. Key 
logistics decision-makers and the roles of their respective commands are introduced in the 
course of this account. The chronology demonstrates the uniqueness of the operation and 
thus lays the groundwork for thoughtful discussion of the lessons learned from it. 
The Mogadishu operation was unique in that other recent humanitarian logistical 
missions were so comparably minor in terms of scope and duration. The operation further 
tested the limits of U.S. logistics doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. [Ref. 8:p. 
2] For example, a four-ship squadron of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships 
theoretically carries all supplies necessary to support a 16,500-man Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) for thirty days. However, during Operation Restore Hope, an MPF became 
the principal source of supplies for more than 30,000 coalition forces during the first fifty 
days of operations. [Ref. 9:p. 28] Of course, the Somalia logistics operations were limited 
in terms of combat support requirements. The intervention did not call for extensive support 
of armored vehicles, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, or other major weapons systems. 
Nevertheless, given the absence of suitable host-nation infrastructure, Mogadishu port 
logistical operations remained particularly daunting. [Ref. 8 :p. 31] 
U.S. operations at the port of Mogadishu can be segmented into four distinct periods: 
1. 20 November - 8 December 1992. CENTCOM develops plans for the 
operation. U.S. forces make subsequent preparations. 
2. 9 December 1992- 27 January 1993. Marine Forces (MARFOR) combat 
service support units provide logistical support to coalition forces from MPF 
stocks. 
3. 28 January - 3 May 1993. Army personnel attached to a JTF support 
component bear responsibility for force sustainment and other logistical 
operations in the theater. 
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4. 4 May 1993 - 31 March 1994. UNOSOM II controls continuing sustainment 
operations until the withdrawal ofU.S. forces. [Ref. 9:p. 15] 
The chronology details the significant events affecting port operations in each period. 
A. PLANS AND PREPARATION (20 NOVEMBER- 8 DECEMBER 1992) 
Noting the apparent failure of Operation Provide Hope to improve conditions in a 
chaotic Somalia in the fall of 1992, the CENTCOM staff developed a broad concept of 
operations long before receiving the order to act [Ref. 8:p. 5]. On 20 November, 
USCENTCOM advised the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanded by 
Lieutenant General Johnston to prepare for possible operations in support of the 
humanitarian effort in Somalia. Although I MEF had expected to assist the insertion of 
additional Pakistani U.N. troops into the theater, this was the first warning of imminent 
involvement of American ground forces. 
1. Planning Process 
On 21 November, a I MEF planning cell from Camp Pendleton arrived at MacDill 
AFB to begin constructing joint plans for military intervention in Somalia with the 
CENTCOM staff. Having prepared the preliminaries for the Warning Order and 
Commander's Estimate of the Situation, the planning cell returned to Camp Pendleton on 23 
November. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), 
Army General Hoar, briefed the Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS) the following day. Although he 
advised the JCS against military involvement in Somalia, he revealed the tentative plans for 
such a contingency. He further advised that a U.N. endorsement of U.S. intervention be a 
precondition if military action must be taken. 
The JCS, however, recommended military action contingent on U.N. approval when 
they briefed President Bush on 25 November. Thus, on the same day, the formal planning 
process began with the creation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia Future Planning Cell. 
Under the direction of the I MEF G-3 Future Operations Officer, the planning cell initiated 
the crisis action planning which would ultimately produce a CENTCOM Operations Order 
(OPORDER). [Ref. 8:p. 35] 
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To manage the impending deployment, the planning cell employed the Joint 
Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The system was used successfully for 
command and control of previous deployments and seemed well-suited for the Somalia 
contingency. [Ref. 8:p. 14] 
JOPES works with a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) base developed 
by a JTF. The TPFDD details which units are to be deployed, unit composition in terms of 
cargo and personnel, the location ofunits, and where they must be delivered. [Ref. 10:p. 11] 
The database is loaded into the Worldwide Military Command End Control System 
(WWMCCS), a computer system to which the JTF, CENTCOM staff, and service 
components have access [Ref. 11:p. 34]. Once a TPFDD base is fully developed for a given 
operation, planners have access to a single, reliable framework for efficient transportation 
management. [Ref. 10:p. 11] 
Complete data base development, however, sometimes takes eighteen months under 
normal circumstances, and there was no preexisting TPFDD for the Somalia crisis [Ref. 1 O:p. 
xii]. Consequently, the planning cell derived a TPFDD base from OPLAN 1002 used during 
Operation Desert Shield in 1991. JTF planners revised this TPFDD throughout the operation 
as events and force requirements dictated. [Ref. 8:p. 11] 
2. Concept of Operations 
CENTCOM planners anticipated the eventual deployment of approximately 28,000 
U.S. active duty personnel and their equipment to Somalia. Most would be light forces. 
[Ref. 1 O:p. 3] These forces would by transported to the theater as follows: 
1. Army and Marine Corps personnel would be flown from the Continental U.S. 
(CONUS) and Europe aboard aircraft of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Flights would originate from Griffiss 
AFB on the East Coast and March AFB on the West Coast, 8,044 and 10,439 
miles from Mogadishu respectively. 
2. Army equipment would be mostly shipped from the CONUS seaports of 
Bayonne, Norfolk, Savannah, and Beaumont aboard vessels chartered by the 
MSC. TRANSCOM also initially activated three Fast Sea lift Ships (FSSs) 
for the task. Additional supplies and equipment would come from 
prepositioned ships at Diego Garcia. 
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3. The bulk of Marine Corps equipment and supplies would arrive in 
Mogadishu aboard four Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs) at or in the 
vicinity of Diego Garcia. The ships could collectively support a Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of 16,500 men for a month. [Ref 1 O:pp. 3-9] 
The CENTCOM planning cell expected no host nation assistance and assumed that virtually 
all infrastructure would have to be transported with deploying forces [Ref. IO:p. 5]. Of 
course, strategic airlift and sealift operations would begin only after U.S. marines seized the 
Mogadishu airport and harbor facilities during Phase I of the operation. 
Seizure of these key Mogadishu facilities was the responsibility of a Special Purpose 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) deployed aboard a four-ship Amphibious Task 
Unit (ATU) in the Indian Ocean. The ATU consisted of the amphibious warships U.S.S. 
Tripoli (LPH-10), U.S.S. Juneau (LPD-10), and U.S.S. Rushmore (LSD-47) as well as MV 
Lummus, an MPF ship ordinarily assigned to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Three 
(MPSRON-3) at Guam. [Ref. 8:p. 36] A combination container and roll-on/roll-off ship 
(RO/RO), MV Lummus was an unusual addition. Yet, because the ATU lacked two of its 
standard five amphibious ships, the MPF ship partly compensated for reduced ATU cargo 
capacity. [Ref. 11 :p. 39] The combination of ships was known as "three plus one," and was 
the first time an MPF ship deployed in company with amphibious warships [Ref. 8:p. 28]. 
The unique unit set a course for Mogadishu on 30 November [Ref. 8:p. 36]. Aboard were 
1,800 marines [Ref. 10:p. 3]. 
3. Unit Preparation and Organization (1-4 December) 
On 2 December, an Offload Preparation Party (OPP) and Survey, Liaison, and 
Reconnaissance Party (SLRP) left CONUS for Mombasa, Kenya. There they would meet 
MV Lummus and begin preparations for sealift operations at Mogadishu. OPPs for three 
MPF ships assigned to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (MPSRON-2) left the same 
day for Diego Garcia. [Ref. 8:p. 36] 
Meanwhile, efforts to formulate plans for the now inevitable Somalia intervention 
reached a furious pace. W aming orders reached selected commands on the first week of 
December. The Army began conducting regular top-level briefings on Somalia and activated 
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a crisis response cell on 2 December. Within the next few days, TRANSCOM and MTMC 
established dedicated operations centers; AMC began Operation Restore Hope planning and 
reporting procedures, and MSC identified ships for deployment. [Ref. 1 O:p. 8] 
At his headquarters in Washington, D.C., MSC commander Vice Admiral Michael 
Kalleres and his staff struggled to coordinate the details of a sealift operation to occur more 
than 8,000 miles away. Having received an "informal heads-up" in late November, MSC 
staff conducted a market survey for tugboats and chartered three to assist in Mogadishu port 
operations [Ref. 12]. Furthermore, they selected three harbor pilots for the operation, one 
American and two Anglo-Kenyans [Ref. 13]. By the first week in December, MSC activated 
three of eight FSSs [Ref. 12]. The command also notified the operating companies of the 
MPF ships to be deployed, Maersk Line Limited and the AMSEA Corporation. [Ref. 14] 
It was indirectly through the operating companies that advanced word of the 
impending operation first reached the MPSRON-2 staff aboard MV Phillips, the squadron 
flagship moored at Diego Garcia. MPSRON-2 officers received warning of possible MPF 
tasking on 2 December from the ships' masters. The masters relayed information given to 
them by their operating company representatives. The squadron staff thus anticipated sortie 
orders for the MPF ships and perhaps some other ships controlled by MPSRON-2. [Ref. 14] 
Captain Robert Allee, commander ofMPSRON-2 (COMPSRON TWO), controlled 
fifteen ships divided into two squadrons forward-deployed at Diego Garcia. These squadrons 
are known collectively as the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF). The first squadron, the 
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) consisted of five ships: MV sAnderson, Bonnyman, 
Phillips, Hauge, and Baugh-- all operated by Maersk Line Limited. Hauge and Baugh were 
in CONUS for their maintenance cycle. The remaining ten ships comprised the second 
squadron, Prepositioned Ships Squadron Two. [Ref. 14] 
COMPSRON-TWO's MPF ships are Hauge-class, combination container and ro-ro 
ships specifically designed for Marine Corps prepositioning. They are powered by a single, 
slow-speed diesel, and are capable of making seventeen knots. Slightly smaller than MV 
Lummus, aHauge-class ship can carry 332 containers and has 12,000 square feet available 
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for Marine vehicles. Each ship is chartered from Maersk Line Ltd. (U.S.A.) for twenty-five 
years by MSC. Annual charter costs are roughly $12 million per ship. [Ref. 15:p. 22] 
The prepositioned squadron ships mainly carry consumable supplies for the Army, 
Air Force, and Navy forces. Ammunition and other dry cargo are carried aboard four LASH 
(Lighter Aboard) Ships at Diego Garcia. The ordnance is contained in several climate-
controlled barges stacked in a LASH cargo hold and on its main deck. The ammunition 
barges can be discharged in stream at ports where pier services are unavailable. [Ref. 15 :p. 
21] LASHs also carry two tugs to maneuver the barges to delivery points ashore. In addition 
to the LASHs, the prepositioned squadron includes cargo fuel tankers and an Army 
watercraft carrier MV American Cormorant. [Ref. 14] 
Which specific ships would be ordered to Somalia remained uncertain to the 
MPSRON-2 staff on 3 December as they awaited tasking. [Ref. 14] 
While individual commands continued to make eleventh-hour preparations, 
CENTCOM devised an organizational structure for the upcoming expedition. CINCCENT 
assumed operational control of I MEF on 2 December and designated General Johnston as 
Commander, Marine Forces (MARFOR) Central Command . USCINCCENT next 
established the JTF headquarters on the following day with General Johnson as its 
commander (CJTF). [Ref. 8:pp. 35-36] I MEF staff would largely comprise JTF 
headquarters. In Somalia, the CJTF would command a Marine component of the I MEF, an 
Army component consisting of Tenth Mountain Division soldiers, and certain local Air Force 
and Navy units. [Ref. 8:p. 1] MARFOR and its MPF assets would provide initial logistical 
support to the JTF [Ref. 9:p. 25]. A chain of command was thus established for Phases I and 
II of Operation Restore Hope. 
4. Execution of Orders 
On 4 December, the President ordered a "substantial American force" into Somalia 
[Ref. 10:p. xi], and USGINCCENT released its OPORDER to participating units on 5 
December [Ref. 8:p. 38]. Units afloat responded immediately. 
COMPSRON TWO ordered his three MPF ships at Diego Garcia to sortie upon 
receipt of the OPORDER. MVs Anderson, Bonnyman, and Phillips- commodore and staff 
aboard- departed for Mogadishu on 5 December. The ships' Offload Preparation Parties 
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arrived in Diego Garcia the previous day and were embarked. [Ref. 14] The MPF headed 
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Also on 5 December, the Tripoli ATU arrived on station twenty-five miles off 
Mogadishu in preparation for the SPMAGTF landing. MV Lummus, having detached from 
the ATU the previous day, was headed for Mombasa to receive its OPP and the SLRP. 
The parties arrived in Mombasa on 4 December and embarked two days later when the 
Lummus reached port. The ship rejoined the ATU on station on 8 December. 
The Commander, Amphibious Group Three (COMPHIBGRU THREE), Rear 
Admiral Perkins, was designated as MPF commander (CMPF, Somalia) for the operation on 
6 December [Ref. 8:p. 38]. The admiral reassigned the Commander Amphibious Squadron 
Five (COMPHIBRON FIVE), Captain Boyce, and his officers as his staff [Ref. 15]. The 
next day, before leaving for Mogadishu, the newly-assigned CMPF joined the CJTF Somalia 
Future Planning Cell at I MEF headquarters at Camp Pendleton. [Ref. 8:p. 38] Meanwhile, 
the JTF staff validated the first five days TPFDD for the operation [Ref. 11 :p. 34]. With D-
day only a few days distant, the initial steps of the deployment were began to proceed with 
some coordination. 
B. DEPLOYMENT: MARFOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERIOD (9 
DECEMBER 1992 - 27 JANUARY 1993) 
Operation Restore Hope began on the morning of 9 December 1992, D-day, with the 
landing of the 15th MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) from the Tripoli ATU. At 0430 hours 
local time, H-hour, a Marine rifle company of 140 men embarked in rigid raider craft seized 
"Objective Bravo," the Mogadishu port facility. Simultaneously to the south, a second 
~ontingent of one rifle company and an amphibious assault vehicle platoon landed ashore 
and occupied the Mogadishu airport, "Objective Alpha." A reserve force landed ashore 
fifteen minutes later in raider craft to reinforce the contingent at the airport. [Ref. 3 :pp. 14-
16] 
Because Colonel Gregory Newbold, the SPMAGTF commander [Ref. 15: p. 35], was 
uncertain about native anti-aircraft capabilities, the marines landed in surface craft [Ref. 8: 
p. 38]. The only "opposition" to the insertion, however, came from curious unarmed 
Somalis at the seaport who were dispersed with three rifle shots, the only shots fired during 
D-day. [Ref. 3:p. 16] 
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With the objectives secured, the SPMAGTF commander felt confident enough to 
employ aircraft. He therefore dispatched an additional 440 marines to the airport, the scene 
of greatest native activity, to supplement the 725-man occupying contingent [Ref. 3 :p. 16]. 
An Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT) accompanied the Marine reinforcements and 
quickly established air traffic control over the airfield. Two C-141 cargo aircraft carrying 
more Air Force personnel arrived only a few hours later, [Ref. 15:p. 35] the first AMC 
aircraft of the operation to land in Mogadishu [Ref. 11 :p. 25]. By noon, the first units of! 
MEF landed in Mogadishu aboard AMC passenger aircraft [Ref. 8:p. 38]. The airport was 
fully operational (Figure 2). 
Meanwhile, the SLRP flew ashore by helicopter and met divers from the Tripoli A TU 
at the port facility. The SLRP consisted mainly of U.S. Coast Guard and Navy Reserve 
personnel and included harbor pilot Captain Buttner, USNR. The divers were Navy SEALS. 
[Ref. 13] Together the parties began a detailed hydrographic survey of the harbor to ascertain 
the feasibility of a pierside MPF offload [Ref. 8:p. 38]. What the party encountered was 
appalling. 
The port was utterly devastated. Pier utility services like electricity, water, steam, and 
fuel were nonexistent. Derelict yard cranes, forklifts, and other neglected vehicles were 
scattered about the area. Two tugboats were left rusting at the pier unattended. Debris and 
human feces littered the facility. The SLRP encountered conditions which defied the worst 
expectations of military planners. 
Furthermore, looting of port warehouses by natives continued with impunity. During 
UNOSOM I, relief agencies constructed a wall of containers stacked three high around the 
facility perimeter for security. Nevertheless, native youths succeeded in stealing grain from 
U.N. stores despite the Marine occupation. During the day, individuals breached the 
perimeter, and at night gangs attempted to enter the facility by force. Although SPMAGTF 
personnel could deter looters throughout the compound during the day, they could only 
secure the area within the wall at night. [Ref. 8:pp. 38-40] The pilferage continued for days. 
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1. Operation Restore Hope Phase 1: The MPF Offload Begins 
Preparations for sealift operations continued uninterrupted despite the abysmal 
conditions at the Mogadishu port. One day after D-day, the CJTF arrived in Mogadishu and 
established his headquarters at the former U.S. Embassy grounds in the southern part of the 
city [Ref. 8:p. 40]. 
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Also on 10 December, the divers from the U.S.S. Tripoli completed their initial 
harbor survey. They discovered that soundings adjacent to the piers were only thirty-five to 
thirty-seven feet at high tide and thirty-five feet at the harbor center. The divers also noted 
the two derelict tugs moored to the seaward pier. Alongside the same pier, the mast of a 
sunken tug protruded twenty feet above the water at high tide. Another navigation hazard, 
a cylindrical water heater, lay at the bottom near the seaward pier. Before completing their 
full survey three days later, it was already apparent that maneuvering the large, deep-draft 
MPSs and FSSs would be a risky endeavor. [Ref. 8:pp. 40-41] 
Nevertheless, two tugboats chartered by MSC for such sealift operations, Barbara 
and Bison Two [Ref. 14 ], arrived from Mombasa in the afternoon of 10 December. The three 
MPF ships ofMPSRON-2 arrived on station offMogadishu soon afterward [Ref. 8:p. 41]. 
Furthermore, the prepositioned LASHs SS Green Harbour and SS Green Valley departed 
Diego Garcia. The ships were to deliver Army cargo including hospital supplies and combat 
rations to the forces in Mogadishu. [Ref. 1 O:p. 31] 
Admiral Perkins, CMPF, arrived in the evening at the Mogadishu airport and 
immediately flew to MV Lummus. There he joined Colonel Newbold who reported the 
observations of the SLRP. The CMPF then decided to bring Lummus pierside in the 
morning. [Ref. 8:p. 41] 
Adding to their concerns about inadequate infrastructure, the CJTF and CMPF were 
also already aware that many coalition forces were not self-sustaining. Ctl::ntrary to 
expectations, it was clear that U.S. forces would have to provide considerable logistical 
support to some forces. The U.N. was in no position to offer such support. Under the 
prevailing conventions of combined operations, supplies had to be provided to coalition units 
upon request. U.S. forces could only deny requests for certain items, such as major weapon 
systems, and if fulfilling a request jeopardized U.S. readiness. [Ref. 9:pp. 20-21] That the 
limits of MARFOR logistical capability would be sorely tested in the initial weeks of the 
operation was quite apparent. 
As ordered by the CJTF, MARFOR was to provide so-called "common-item, 
common-user support" to U.S. and coalition forces until relieved by Army logistics units 
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around D+32. This concept entailed providing bulk fuel, potable water, combat rations, and 
other commodities requested by units in the theater. The bulk of such supplies, of course, 
would initially come from the MPF. [Ref. 11 :p. 43] MARFOR, therefore, was the logical 
candidate to be the common item, common-user provider as the sole entity with any 
substantial stocks in Somalia [Ref. 9:p. 25]. 
The First Force Service Support Group, Forward (1st FSSG (Forward)), the 
MARFOR combat logistical support element, would provide logistical support to military 
forces. The unit maintained the vast majority of MARFOR's logistics-related equipment. 
Although based in Mogadishu with the bulk of U.S. and coalition troops, [Ref. 9:p. 26] the 
unit expected to provide support to forces 350 miles away, far greater than the fifty mile 
range anticipated in Marine Corps doctrine [Ref. ll:p. 43]. Together with the OPPs, 1st 
FSSG (Forward) would conduct the MPF offload and thus establish the Mogadishu port as 
a supply hub for all of southern Somalia [Ref. 11 :p. 40]. 
MV Lummus made an uneasy entrance into the Mogadishu port (Figure 3) on 11 
December [Ref. 8:p. 41]. Despite high wind and seas, the ship moored at the seaward pier 
on a flood tide without incident [Ref. 13]. The other MPF ships remained at anchor outside 
the port because the pier could accommodate only one large ship at a time [Ref. 2:p. 48]. 
That same day, 1st FSSG (Forward) personnel landed in Mogadishu. They and the Lummus 
OPP began the MPF offload on 12 December [Ref. 8:p. 41]. 
Also on 12 December, the U.S. Army watercraft carrier MV American Cormorant 
departed Hythe, England for Mogadishu. The ship, ordinarily prepositioned with MPSRON-
2, was a float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO) ship. As such, it could discharge or recover a variety 
of waterborne craft on her main deck by ballasting. The ship was in England to retrieve its 
cargo after undergoing shipyard overhaul in Hamburg, Germany. Its embarked craft 
including two floating cranes, two tugs, and several landing craft. [Ref. 1 O:pp. 31-32] Most 
importantly, the ship carried an Army Reverse Osmosis Purification Unit (ROWPU) barge. 
The barge contained two ROWPUs capable of producing 150,000 gallons of badly-needed 
potable water per day for forces in Somalia. MV American Cormorant was expected to 
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Figure 3. Mogadishu Port Facility [Ref. 12] 
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Meanwhile, as U.N. humanitarian relief ships began to arrive off Mogadishu, the 
CMPF took the first steps to create a port authority [Ref. 8:p. 12]. The first relief ship, Sea 
Pearl, arrived in port on 13 December in support of the World Food Program [Ref. 8:p. 43] 
Admiral Perkins established CMPF staff headquarters in a dilapidated two-story port 
administration building in the western part of the compound. [Ref. 15] The CMPF next 
directed the cleaning and disinfection of the port compound. Furthermore, the admiral acted 
to tighten perimeter security, ordering such measures as the placement of additional 
concertina wire. The CMPF also began to develop a prioritization policy for scheduling the 
pier rotation of ships. [Ref. 12] Preference, of course, would go to U.S. sealift and force 
sustainment shipping. [Ref. 17] Slowly, a structure for coordinating port operations began 
to evolve. 
On 15 December, the prepositioned tanker SS American Osprey arrived off 
Mogadishu from Diego Garcia [Ref. 8:p. 44]. The ship was laden with nine million gallons 
of JP-5, the fuel consumed by almost all U.S. military vehicles. The ship also carried a 
significant quantity of regular, unleaded gasoline (MOGAS) required in lesser quantities by 
some coalition forces for certain vehicles. [Ref. 9:pp. 35-36] SS American Osprey 
transported an Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). The system consisted of a 
large buoyant fuel tank (SALM) stowed amidships and a three-mile-long flexible pipeline 
on reels. The ship could discharge and anchor the SALM offshore, pump cargo fuel into it, 
and depart the scene. The SALM, once connected to a receiving station via the pipeline, 
could independently pump its contents ashore. [Ref. 14] SS American Osprey and a similar 
tanker, SS Potomac, would spend months on station and provide most ofthe theater's bulk 
fuel, but the OPDS was never used. [Ref. 13] 
Lack of local experience combined with high winds and seas off Mogadishu 
precluded the potentially dangerous OPDS deployment [Refs. 13 and 17]. Instead, SS 
American Osprey used an Amphibious Assault Buoyant Fuel System (AABFS) provided by 
1st FSSG [Ref. 9:p. 36]. This floating flexible conduit connected the ship with a fuel farm 
which 1st FSSG established on 15 December at Green Beach near the Mogadishu airport. 
[Ref. 11 :p. 46] The ship positioned itself only a few thousand yards off Green Beach in a 
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four-point moor. By late December, Navy SeaBees connected the AABFS using powered 
lighterage from the MPF ships. [Ref. 14] When SS American Osprey began discharging 
soon afterward, the Green Beach facility became the central fuel distribution point in 
Somalia [Ref. 9:p. 36]. 
Also on 15 December, the MV Lummus completed its offload and prepared to get 
underway. MV Anderson, which moored at the opposite pier the previous day, awaited 
Lummus's departure to complete offloading. However, high seas delayed MV Lummus for 
twenty-four hours, and Anderson did not shift berths until 16 December. 
Because the AABFS was not yet aligned between SS American Osprey and Green 
Beach, MV Anderson's offload was interrupted in order for the ship to discharge cargo fuel. 
The fuel was needed by SPMAGTF and Army units conducting operations in the South at 
Baledogle and Baidoa. [Ref. 8:p. 44] Anderson, like the other MPSs, carried approximately 
one million gallons of JP-5 and a small amount ofMOGAS [Ref. 9:p. 35]. The ship pumped 
fuel directly to tanker trucks on the pier [Ref. 9:p. 27]. MPF ships would be occasionally 
tasked to provide bulk fuel by the JTF until American Osprey began discharging. 
Moreover, MPF ships also became a critical source of potable water. The Army 
ROWPU barge was not yet in Somalia, and smaller field ROWPUs could not keep pace with 
demand. The evaporators aboard the MPF ships could distill seawater and store a sizeable 
surplus quantity of potable water. [Ref. 9:pp. 29-34] Once an MPF ship completed its 
offload, it cycled out to sea to accumulate water. MPF ships would moor adjacent to Green 
Beach and discharge the water to 1st FSSG water bladders ashore using an Amphibious 
Assault Bouyant Water System (AABWS). The system was essentially a bouyant hose 
similar to that of the AABFS. [Ref. 11 :p. 41] In the following month, MPF ships each 
produced an average 50,000 gallons of potable per day water for the JTF [Ref. 9:p. 34]. 
MPF activity was already the focal point of logistics efforts in Somalia when 
Operation Restore Hope Phase I concluded ahead of schedule on 16 December [Ref. 18:p. 
10]. MARFOR secured the Baledogle airfield during a helibome assault on 13 December. 
Three days later, the SPMAGTF conducted another such assault on the Baidoa airfield. The 
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insertion phase of the expedition ended when marines secured the field at 0649 hours on 16 
December. [Ref. 8:pp. 42-44] Meanwhile, the MPF offload continued largely as planned. 
2. Operation Restore Hope Phase II: The MPF Offload Concludes 
The establishment of Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs), Phase II, began on 17 
December as MV Anderson's offload slowly progressed. Because many MARFOR units had 
not yet arrived in Mogadishu, vehicles and equipment delivered by MV Lummus 
accumulated at the port staging area. This temporarily delayed 1st FSSG stevedores in 
offloading Anderson. The ship nevertheless completed its offload on 19 December, early 
according to the JTF timeline. MV Bonnyman relieved Anderson as the third MPS to 
offload. [Ref. II :p. 40] Table :2. summarizes the actual MPF offload timeline. 
Ship name 
MV 1st Lt. jack Lummus 
MV PFC james Anderson 
MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman 
MV Pvt. Franklin j, Phillips 
Dates of offload1 
12-15 December 
1 4-1 9 December 
20-23 December 
2 6-2 8 December 
a. These are actual offload dates. Some ships arrived In port 
sooner, or stayed beyond their offload. 
Table 2. MPF Offload Dates [Ref. 8] 
SS Green Valley was also scheduled to go pierside to deliver its cargo about the same 
time as MV Bonnyman, but this plan met with considerable frustration [Ref. 11 :p. 36]. The 
LASH arrived in the vicinity of Mogadishu with its sister ship SS Green Harbour on D+5. 
The ship was to offload a variety of Army supplies and equipment: material for a field 
hospital, MREs, tents, portable generators, ROWPUs, and material handling equipment 
(MHE). However, the ship's dimensions and Mogadishu weather conditions conspired to 
deny Green Valley an opportunity to discharge cargo at Mogadishu. [Ref. lO:p. 31] 
28 
The CMPF and COMPSRON TWO had no choice but to offload the LASHs 
elsewhere. First, persistent high seas and the ships' deep draft precluded efforts to moor 
them pierside. Second, the option to discharge the ships' barges offshore, or "in stream," was 
also too hazardous. The port offered too little space and shelter to conduct such an evolution. 
In-stream operations would be particularly difficult because, in order to access desired 
containers, large numbers of ammunition barges would have to be discharged. [Ref. 1 O:pp. 
31-32] Consequently, SS Green Valley was dispatched on 19 December to Mombasa. There 
the ship would cross-deck its Army cargo to MV Lummus [Ref. 8:p. 45]. 
Meanwhile, in the U.S., the deployment of Army Forces (ARFOR) was proceeding 
rapidly. By 20 December, MTMC had shipped approximately 30,000 tons of military cargo 
to CONUS seaports, ninety-five percent of which went to Bayonne, Norfolk/Newport News, 
Savannah, and Beaumont. [Ref. 10:p. 19] Furthermore, MSC had assigned eight ships for 
the sealift of the Army cargo. These included two ROIROs already on charter to the MSC, 
MV American Eagle and MV American Falcon. The remaining six were FSSs: USNS 
Pollux, USNS Altair, USNS Algol, USNS Capella, USNS Bellatrix, and USNS Denebola. 
The FSSs had been activated by order ofTRANSCOM from a reduced operating status with 
four days notice. [Ref. lO:pp. 35] Seven of the sealift ships departed CONUS for 
Mogadishu during the last two weeks of December [Ref. 12]. 
Back in Mogadishu, the CMPF continued efforts to develop port infrastructure. More 
humanitarian relief ships were converging on Mogadishu, and the port still lacked charted 
anchorages or a shipping control authority. Rear Admiral Perkins therefore tasked 
COMPSRON TWO to establish a port control service. 
The MPSRON-2 commodore, Captain Allee, subsequently directed his operations 
officer to designate anchorages and devise a "Mogadishu Port Control" watch bill. From 
MV Anderson's bridge, MPSRON-2 staff members assigned anchorages and advised 
coalition ships using VHF radio communication. With the arrival of tugboats Fast Fox and 
Smit-Lloyd 111 by late December, "Mogadishu Port Control" also directed a total offour 
MSC-chartered tugs. Port control officers additionally coordinated passenger and supply 
transfers between ships at anchor, a service safely provided by the large, seagoing Smit-Lloyd 
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111. Despite some improvisation and limited training, "Mogadishu Port Control" personnel 
became in time a reasonably efficient port management service. [Ref. 14] 
Having addressed the issue of shipping control, the CMPF confronted problems 
relating to the pierside support for U.N. relief ships. Specifically, the port lacked a dedicated 
stevedore force which could help offload grain sacks and other humanitarian supplies from 
ships moored at the seaward pier. Consequently, the CMPF cooperated with U.N. relief 
organizations to hire a large native work crew in late December. Supervised closely by 
MARFOR security personnel, the native stevedores transferred grain sacks from the ships 
and the pier to nearby warehouses or relief truck convoys. [Refs. 12 and 14] The pierside 
rotation of relief ships could thus proceed more quickly. 
Port development efforts were already well in hand when the first Army units arrived 
in Somalia. On 21 December, an advanced party of the 4th Transportation Battalion of the 
7th Transportation Group (7th TRANS) landed in Mogadishu to consult with the CMPF 
staff. This was the first step in transferring responsibility for port operations to the U.S. 
Army. [Ref. 8:p. 47] With port services and infrastructure rapidly improving, CMPF 
anticipated a smooth turnover. 
Yet, affairs to the south proved disappointing for the JTF and CMPF. SS Green 
Valley tried to enter Mombasa harbor on 21 December, but Kenyan authorities denied the 
ship access. The officials insisted that Mombasa could not accommodate a ship of such 
length. They furthermore forbade the in-stream discharge of ammunition barges in the 
channel or harbor. [Ref. 1 O:p. 32] Consequently, the transfer of cargo to Lummus never 
occurred, and an exasperated JTF decided instead to airlift field hospital material to 
Mogadishu on C-141s [Ref. 8:p. 45]. The LASH fiasco thus continued for several weeks. 
The pace of port operations at Mogadishu was meanwhile increasing. On 22 
December, MV Scheldemond arrived at the Mogadishu anchorage with high-priority cargo 
for the JTF. The MSC-chartered ship carried 62,000 MREs and AM-2 matting drawn from 
prepositioned stocks in Thumrait, Oman. [Ref. 9:p. 28] The matting was urgently needed 
to reconstruct airstrips in Southern Somalia controlled by U.S. forces. MV Scheldemond 
offloaded its cargo on 24 December. [Ref. 8:p. 47] 
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The first coalition warship, San Marco, also arrived from Italy on 24 December. By 
mid January, twenty-five coalition ships would offload 22,300 metric tons of military 
equipment and supplies including 1,987 vehicles, 819 containers, and 50 helicopters. [Ref. 
8:p. 48] 
Furthermore, on 25 December, MV American Eagle arrived at Mogadishu from Rota, 
Spain. This was the first ship assigned for Army sealift to arrive. The ship was diverted in 
late November by MSC for sealift duty, tasked to offload SeaBee cargo in Somalia, and 
ordered to Bayonne to load Tenth Mountain Division cargo. Six more sealift ships carrying 
Army cargo, five of them FSSs, were en route from CONUS. [Ref. 12] 
As overall port activity increased, however, the MPF offload was drawing to a close. 
MV Phillips began offloading on 26 December. During the three-day evolution, the CJTF 
decided that offloading a fifth MPSRON, MV Hauge, would be unnecessary. The ship, 
having completed its maintenance cycle, was en route from Blount Island Command at 
Jacksonville, Florida. MARFOR planners at first believed that the vehicles aboard Hauge 
would be necessary to support extensive logistics operations. They observed, however, that 
vehicles offloaded from Phillips were not being issued. Moreover, the first FSS carrying 
Army vehicles and equipment was scheduled to soon arrive. The CJTF therefore ordered 
MV Hauge to remain on station offMogadishu, its cargo intact in case of unforseen MAGTF 
requirements. Consequently, when MV Phillips finished offloading on 28 December, the 
MPF offload concluded. [Ref. 8:pp. 48-49] 
The date 28 December also marked the end of Operation Restore Hope Phase II. 
Eight days earlier, MARFOR and Belgian forces conducted a successful amphibious landing 
at the port of Kismayo. MARFOR also seized the Bardera Humanitarian Relief Sector 
(HRS) on 23 December and assisted French troops secure the Oddure relief sector on 
Christmas. Italian forces occupied the Gialassi HRS on 27 December, and the final objective, 
Belet Uen, was secured by ARFOR and Canadian forces the next day. [Ref. 8:pp. 46-50] 
With little native opposition, the JTF was able to secure the relief sectors two months ahead 
of schedule [Ref. 18:p. 10]. 
31 
Phase II ended as Mogadishu port began to reach basic standards expected of a 
modern facility. The port was fully operational, and pierside rotation of ships was robust. 
Given the completion of the MPF offload, the CJTF and CMPF could now consider plans 
for backloading and for transferring control of logistics. 
3. Operation Restore Hope Phase III: Port Control Transition and MPF 
Backload Commencement 
On 29 December, the 1st FSSG (Forward) staff submitted its MPF backload plan to 
General Johnston. They intended to backload the least useful equipment and supplies first 
and the most useful material last. In view of Phase II's early completion, 1st FSSG proposed 
to start on 15 January and finish by 28 February 1993. [Ref. 52] 
The JTF headquarters staff meanwhile met with five U.N. representatives to discuss 
the eventual transfer of operational control to UNOSOM II. The staff had been planning 
Phase III objectives since Christmas and subsequently developed a strategy for gradual 
turnover of responsibilities. The JTF presented these plans to the U.N. party and thereby 
took the initial step toward a U.S. drawdown. [Ref. 8:p. 50] 
The following day, 31 December, a familiar problem resurfaced. MV American 
Cormorant arrived off Mogadishu and unsuccessfully attempted to discharge its watercraft, 
including the valuable ROWPU barge. High seas were again the culprit. As a result, forces 
ashore continued to rely heavily on MPF ships for water while waiting to receive the 
ROWPU barge. 
SS Green Harbour was dispatched a day later to the port of Kismayo where the sea 
state was thought to be more favorable. There too, however, in-stream operations were made 
impossible by high winds and swells. Both SS Green Harbour and SS Green Valley were 
consequently ordered back to Diego Garcia. [Ref. 10:p. 32] 
Nevertheless, local weather conditions did not hamper the offload of Fast Sealift 
Ships. The first FSS, USNS Pollux, arrived at Mogadishu on 1 January 1993 [Ref. 11 :p. 42]. 
Despite concerns about the ship's draft and the sea state, Pollux moored without incident to 
the seaward pier [Ref. 14]. 
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The FSS offload proceeded despite some obstacles. There was only one berth at 
Mogadishu to accommodate an FSS. Furthermore, USNS Capella experienced a serious 
engineering failure in the Mediterranean while en route. [Ref. IO:p. 37] By mid-January, 
however, four FSSs had offloaded 23,500 metric tons of ARFOR cargo: 2,648 vehicles, 261 
containers, and 46 helicopters [Ref. 8:p. 52]. The deployment timeline for FSSs and other 
Army sealift ships is shown in Table 3. 
Arrival at Cargo Volume 
Ship Mogadishu (ft2) Cargo Type 
Pollux January01 151,310 10thMTNDIV 
American Falcon January02 94,710 12thAVNBDE 
Altair January04 150,565 10thMTNDIV 
Bellatrix January 08 170,018 CS/CSS 
Algol January 12 168,989 CS/CSS 
Capella January 20 159,786 7th Trans Group 
Total delivered to 1/20/93 895,378 
Denebola 146,000 (est.) CS/CSS 
American Eagle 37,630 CS/CSS 
En route on 1/20/93 183,630 
Total Army Unit Equipment 1,079,008 
Table 3. Sealift of Army Unit Equipment [Ref. 10] 
As the third FSS, USNS Bellatrix, arrived at Mogadishu, MV American Cormorant 
gained clearance to enter Mombasa Harbor on 8 January and began its lighterage offload. 
The ship discharged two utility craft, LCU-2000s, which began making supply deliveries to 
Kismayo and Mogadishu by mid-month. [Ref. IO:pp. 32-33] 
By the following week, the ship also discharged the now infamous ROWPU barge 
and two tugs [Ref. 9:p. 28] The tugs attempted to tow the barge north to Mogadishu, but 
high seas stopped them near Kismayo. To salvage the effort, the sea-going tug Smit-Lloyd 
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111 was dispatched from Mogadishu to Kismayo. There the tug was to retrieve the ROWPU 
barge. [Refs. 14 and 17] 
In Mogadishu, redeployment planning continued. Also on 8 January, the JTF 
headquarters staff unveiled a plan for the drawdown of forces in Somalia. The plan was 
submitted to the CINCCENT three days later. General Hoar approved the general concept 
on the following week, but he rejected a specific timeline. The CINCCENT insisted that the 
drawdown should be driven by events and that only 3d Battalion of the 9th Marines (3d 
Bn/9th Marines) could at first redeploy. [Ref. 8:p. 55] 
Logistics commanders meanwhile planned the transfer of common-user, common-
item support responsibilities from MARFOR to ARFOR control. On 9 January, the 
commanding officers of 1st FSSG (Forward) and Joint Task Force Support Command 
(JTFSC) met to discuss the transition. [Ref. 8:p. 54] Established shortly after D-day and 
staffed predominantly by Army personnel, the JTFSC was the JTF's functional component 
for logistics. The JTFSC was modeled after the 22nd Support Command which provided 
theater logistical support during the Gulf War. The command would centralize the 
management of logistics operations throughout Southern Somalia. [Ref. 8:p. 13] The 
JTFSC commander agreed to relieve 1st FSSG on 28 January provided the command's 
equipment arrived in Somalia as scheduled [Ref. 8:p. 54]. 
Deliberations about the MPF backload also took center stage. On 11 January, Marine 
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) sponsored a three-day backload planning conference at 
Blount Island Command. Planners hoped to maximize recovery of each MPSRON's original 
cargo in Somalia in order to save labor during the ships' eventual reconstitution at Blount 
Island. They also hoped to avoid trouble from the Department of Agriculture which would 
inspect MPF ships upon their return to CONUS. Conference attendees thus emphasized the 
need for a vehicle equipment washdown site at the Mogadishu port. [Ref. 8:p. 53] 
Preventing future difficulties was a central conference theme. 
Yet, at Diego Garcia, the LASH offload dilemma continued to defy plans. SS Green 
Valley and SS Green Harbour dropped anchor in the atoll's lagoon on 11 and 12 January 
respectively. There, in placid waters, the ships were to discharge ammunition barges and 
ballast until light enough to enter Mogadishu harbor. The plan changed, however. Instead, 
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the ships were ordered to cross-deck MRE vans to a commercial container ship bound for 
Mogadishu. [Ref. 1 O:p. 32] During the cargo transfer, one ship's container crane failed 
which prolonged the evolution and JTF frustration. [Ref. 14] 
Meanwhile, as backload plans were being finalized, Admiral Perkins was preparing 
to depart Mogadishu. As the CMPF, he had directed Mogadishu port's remarkable 
transformation from a devastated district to a fully operational harbor. In only thirty-five 
days, the CMPF recorded the following port accomplishments: 
1. The movement of 114 ships and the offload of forty-eight, 
2. The offload of 96 helicopters and 6,668 other military vehicles, 
3. The offload of 3 7,500 metric tons of grain from 14 relief ships, 
4. The delivery of a total 113,950 metric tons of cargo (3,250 tons per day), 
5. The discharge o£5,220,QOO gallons of fuel ashore. [Ref. 12] 
Furthermore, port security had been significantly improved during this period. Warehouse 
pilferage had virtually ceased by 14 January [Ref. 8:p. 26]. 
When Admiral Perkins redeployed to CONUS on 15 January, COMPSRON TWO 
assumed responsibilities for the MPF backload and for coordinating MSC shipping in the 
theater. Responsibility for port control passed to the 7th TRANS commanding officer, 
Colonel Leyben. [Ref. 8:p. 57] The interrelationship of MPSRON-2 and 7th TRANS 
·:-~:~· 
functions demanded close cooperation between the commands. 
To better supervise MSC shipping and to facilitate interaction with 7th TRANS 
personnel, Captain Allee established the Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu 
(MSCO) in the port administration building. MSCO was the successor to the old 
"Mogadishu Port Control" and was staffed by the same MPSRON-2 personnel. The office 
staff occupied a vacated CMPF space located adjacent to the 7th TRANS offices. 
Commander Rose, USNR, the new harbor pilot, became the MSCO officer-in-charge 
answerable to COMPSRON TWO. Using VHF radio and satellite telephone 
communication, MSCO maintained close contact with ships involved in the operation and 
the MSC chain of command. The office also controlled tug operations although theoretically 
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a 7th TRANS function. In practice, MSCO and 7th TRANS shared port control 
responsibilities. [Ref. 14] 
The order to begin backloading MPF equipment arrived on 15 January as 
COMPSRON TWO and 7th TRANS assumed responsibilities for port operations. Formal 
orders from the CINCCENT to redeploy Marine personnel would not be issued for another 
week; however, the 3d Bn/9th Marines prepared for their imminent departure from Somalia. 
On 16 January, the battalion began returning to Mogadishu as Australian forces gradually 
relieved them in Baidoa. The Australians began arriving in the Baidoa sector five days 
earlier and, on 18 January, assumed control from MARFOR. The first dement of 3d Bn/9th 
Marines left Somalia on 19 January. [Ref. 8:p. 55] Battalion equipment was meanwhile 
being staged at the Mogadishu port for backloading. 
Also on 19 January, the MPF backload began as MV Phillips moored to the 
Mogadishu harborside pier [Ref. 8:pp. 53-54]. Table 4 summarizes the actual backload 
timeline. 
Scheduled Actual date Actual date 
Ship sail date entered port left port 
Phillips 22jan 19 jan 23 jan 
Anderson 30Jan 23Jan 29jan 
2 Feb 6 Feb 
Bonnyman 13 Feb 29Jan 1 Feb 
12 Feb 15 Feb 
- :i"-1.- .... 
23 Feb 24 Feb 
23 Apr 25 Apr 
Lummus 28 Feb 15 Feb 18 Feb 
24 Feb 26 Feb 
25 Apr 30Apr 
Table 4. MPF Backload Dates (Ref. 8] 
36 
Two days before the backload's commencement, 1st FSSG (Forward) established a 
fresh water washdown site in response to concerns expressed at the Blount Island backload 
conference [Ref. 8:p. 53]. Redeploying units were required to pass their vehicles and 
equipment through the site. A MARFOR Embarkation Control Group (ECG) was then to 
inspect the vehicles and equipment to ensure a proper washdown before permitting their 
backload. [Ref. 11 :p. 98] Located at the Mogadishu port, the site was made available to all 
JTF units [Ref. 8:p. 53]. The washdown process was part of a backload procedure evolving 
with the transition from MARFOR to JTFSC control. 
That transition was in its final days when the CJTF received the official redeployment 
order from CINCCENT on 22 January. As the Somalia operation entered the redeployment 
period, events were proving very favorable. Two days prior to the receipt of CINCCENT 
orders, MTMC reached a cargo shipment benchmark of 43,000 tons to CONUS ports [Ref. 
IO:p. 19]. On 24 January, the MRE containers cross-decked from the LASH ships in Diego 
Garcia were finally unloaded at Mogadishu port [Ref. 1 O:p. 32]. Furthermore, 3d Bn/9th 
Marines completed their redeployment on 26 January [Ref. 8:p. 55]. The JTFSC thus 
prepared to inherit desirable circumstances. 
C. REDEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT: JTFSC LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
PERIOD (28 JANUARY - 3 MAY) 
On 28 January, the JTFSC assumed responsibility for most logistical operations in 
Somalia [Ref. 8:p. 58]. The command's specific mission as defined by CENTCOM was as 
follows: 
... to provide logistics and medical support for U.S. forces and, as directed, 
to coalition forces deployed in support of Operation Restore Hope. Provide 
common-item support!interservice support, inland distribution of POL (fuel), 
and dry cargo, and common-user port operations. . . .In conjunction with 
CJTF, Somalia and UNOSOM II coordinate for the transfer of JTFSC 
functions and responsibilities to UNOSOM and/or contracted service sup-
port agencies. On order [of] CJTF, Somalia, redeploy units and equipment. 
[Ref. 11 :p. 52] 
More simply put, the JTFSC was to (1) redeploy U.S. forces, (2) sustain forces remaining 
in the theater, and (3) transfer control of operations to UNOSOM II. 
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Some logistical functions, however, did not immediately transfer to JTFSC including 
strategic airlift, airfield operations, and food service. Furthermore, the JTF staff, MARFOR, 
and 1st FSSG (Forward) continued to share functions related to the control of unit 
redeployment movements. Ultimate JTFSC consolidation of movement control, of course, 
remained contingent upon developing a procedure for personnel redeployment and 
• backloading of equipment. [Ref. 8:p. 58] The transitory state lasted through the early stages 
of the redeployment [Ref. 11 :p. 97]. 
Also on 28 January, the CINCCENT granted CJTF permission to implement the 
redeployment timeline. This was the original drawdown timeline submitted by the JTF staff 
on 11 January. Although the timeline was still event-driven, security conditions were so 
much improved that forces could begin withdrawing according to the JTF schedule. [Ref. 
8:pp. 58-59] 
The MPF backload, meanwhile, proceeded unhindered by the organizational changes 
at JTF headquarters. The first part ofMV Anderson's backload neared completion, and an 
interim redeployment protocol was already devised. The steps used by the JTF staff and 
MARFOR to redeploy units follow. 
1. The JTF staff requested permission from the CINCCENT to redeploy a 
specific U.S. unit. 
2. After receiving CINCCENT approval, the JTF directed the appropriate 
component commander to move the unit and its equipment to staging areas 
in Mogadishu. 
3. Component commanders were to contact the JTF Movement Control Center 
(MCC) to schedule common-user transportation for moving the unit to 
Mogadishu. 
4. Component commanders submitted unit lift requirements data to the JTF. 
5. After consolidating and validating unit lift data, the JTF submitted inputs to 
TRANSCOM via CENTCOM. 
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6. TRANSCOM designated sealift and airlift assets for unit redeployment 
through MSC and AMC. The command notified the JTF and MARFOR ECG 
of the assignments. 
7. The ECG called the redeploying unit from the staging area to begin 
washdown and embarkation. 
Because the JTF MCC had recently arrived in Somalia, it was not immediately prepared to 
provide common-user transportation. Consequently, component commanders contacted 
MARFOR for the service during the early days of the redeployment [Ref. 11 :pp. 97 -99]. 
Aided by an accurate TPFDD, the redeploymentlbackload process proceeded more smoothly 
than deployment operations [Ref. 17] 
Much improved too was the JTFSC's force sustainment capability with the long-
awaited arrival of the Army ROWPU barge from Kismayo. The barge's two ROWPUs 
became operational on 28 January [Ref. 9:p. 28], not long after Smit-Lloyd 111 delivered the 
barge to Mogadishu. Theater bulk water production capability radically improved. Output 
from the barge and six Army 3,000 gallons-per-hour (GPH) ROWPUs increased water 
purification five-fold. Since D-day, water production barely out paced consumption, but the 
JTFSC could now plan on building a sizeable potable water surplus. [Ref. 9:pp. 31-44] 
Yet, the JTFSC remained concerned about ensuring an adequate inventory of troop 
rations and other consumable items in the theater. A stable inventory depended on a 
predictable sustainment shipping schedule in a region lacking regular liner service. 
MSC therefore assigned two ships for the sustainment of forces in Somalia: SS 
Gopher State and MV Strong Virginian. MSC originally activated SS Gopher State from 
the Ready Reserve Force to replace the crane ship Corpus Christi. The latter ship was placed 
in an off-hire status when, due to crane failure, it could not load sustainment cargo at 
Bayonne. [Ref. IO:pp. 37-38] MV Strong Virginian, a long-term charter prepositioned ship, 
carried an Army field hospital and was normally assigned to MPSRON-2. Nevertheless, 
MSC recognized that the ships' 500-container capacity made them well suited for point-to-
point service to Mogadishu. [Ref. 19:pp. 15-16] 
The ships were to provide a connection to the regular MSC liner service to the 
Mediterranean -- in essence, a shuttle service. Containers leased by the Department of 
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Defense (DoD) would be stuffed with sustainment cargo at Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
depots and moved to CONUS seaports. The containers would be loaded onto MSC-chartered 
commercial liners operated by the Lykes Brothers Steamship Company or Farrell Lines 
Incorporated. The liners were to offload the containers in Alexandria, Egypt where a four .. 
man MTMC detachment established a transshipment site. [Ref. 1 O:p. 38] When sufficient 
stock accumulated at the transshipment site, either SS Gopher State or MV Strong Virginian 
would be dispatched to retrieve the containers and deliver them to Mogadishu. Both ships 
would remain attached to the JTF and ensure sustainment shipments kept pace with force 
demand for sustainment supplies. [Ref. 17] 
The first sustainment ship, SS Gopher State, arrived in Mogadishu directly from 
CONUS on 30 January. After two months, the shuttle ships would together transship nearly 
1,150 twenty-foot containers between Alexandria and Mogadishu. Ninety-four percent of 
the vans would originate from CONUS, the remainder from Europe, and most contained 
MREs. [Ref. lO:p. 38] Sustainment shipments were to more than satisfy JTFSC 
requirements. 
The CJTF might well have been thinking of Mogadishu port operations when he 
declared Operation Restore Hope's "stabilization" phase at an end on 4 February. A system 
for force sustainment was well established and the water shortage overcome. A 
redeployment timeline was being implemented, and the MPF offload was proceeding close 
to schedule. Moreover, three days before Phase III's end, the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion 
and bulk fuel personnel redeployed. The ATU, with its SPMAGTF embarked, departed the 
theater forty-eight hours later. [Ref. 8:p. 59] Although port efficiency was perhaps now at 
its zenith, port activity was starting to ebb. 
JTF activity in general subsided to such a degree in mid-February that sustainment 
stocks began to accumulate in the theater. By the time MV Maersk Constellation arrived in 
Mogadishu, the JTF no longer had real need for its cargo. Assigned by MSC in December 
to transport MARFOR supplies, the ship made the long voyage from Port Hueneme, 
California, reaching its destination on 15 February. Much of MARFOR was already 
redeployed by that date, and Maersk Constellation thus retained most of its supplies. [Ref. 
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9:pp. 49-50] The ship departed on 23 February for CONUS [Ref. 12] having only offloaded 
some lumber coincidentally useful to ARFOR [Ref. 9:p. 50]. As demonstrated by the 
Maersk Constellation episode, the JTFSC's principal sustainment-related concern was now 
surplus control. 
Of greater concern to the JTF, however, was growing civil unrest in Mogadishu and 
its implications for port security. On 23 February, U.S. and coalition forces became engaged 
in six skirmishes with armed Somalis [Ref. 8:p. 61] In the late afternoon, the port came 
under small arms and grenade attack. MV Bonnyman, moored to the harborside pier for its 
backload, was the ship closest to the origin of fire, but it escaped damage. [Ref. 14] 
Although hostilities subsided after only a few days, port security could no longer be taken 
lightly. 
Despite the violence in Mogadishu, the force redeployment continued. On 28 
February, 1st FSSG (Forward) withdrew from Somalia, and the Brigade Service Support 
Group Seven (BSSG-7) assumed responsibility for MARFOR combat service support 
functions. BSSG-7 therefore gained control of the MPF backload embarkation process. [Ref. 
8:p. 61] 
By early March, even the COMPSRON TWO prepared to withdraw. The backload 
ofMV Phillips and MV Anderson was complete. The former ship had returned to Blount 
Island for cargo reconstitution, and the latter was en route. MV Bonnyman and MV Lummus 
were not yet fully backloaded, but their remaining equipment was not due to return from the 
field for several weeks. MV Hauge, in the meantime, remained fully constituted and without 
tasking. Furthermore, the JTFSC no longer required the MPF to provide bulk water and fuel. 
Several functional Army ROWPUs and the SS American Osprey could easily meet force 
sustainment requirements. Captain Allee therefore saw little reason to remain in Somalia. 
COMPSRON TWO and his staff, embarked on MV Lummus, departed Mogadishu 
for Diego Garcia on 5 ·March. Commander Rose then assumed command of MSCO, 
Mogadishu and thereby took oversight responsibility for local MSC shipping operations. A 
small Navy Reserve staff replaced the office's original MPSRON-2 personnel. MSCO's 
operational chain of command now descended from MSC Headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
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to MSC, Europe in London and then to MSC, Southwest Asia (SW A) in Bahrain. The 
MPSRON-2 staff, however, continued to provide administrative support to SS American 
Osprey and other squadron ships at Mogadishu. [Ref. 14] 
Also during early March, the backload of Army equipment began to build 
momentum. Two FSSs departed Mogadishu for CONUS with backloaded ARFOR 
equipment and vehicles embarked. On 6 March, USNS Denebola left for Bayonne, and 
USNS Capella departed for Charleston on 17 March. The ARFOR backload, however, 
would take several more months to finish. [Ref. 12] 
The MPF backload, however, neared completion by late April. MV Bonnyman and 
MV Lummus returned to the Mogadishu port on 23 and 25 April respectively to complete 
backloading. On 30 April, the first MPF ship to enter the port, MV Lummus, also gained 
the distinction as the last MPSRON to depart. The MPF upon which Operation Restore 
Hope so heavily depended was now redeployed. [Ref. 8:p. 54] 
By early May, the CJTF prepared to close Phase IV of Operation Restore Hope, the 
transition back to U.N. control. Although UNOSOM II would assume control of coalition 
forces in Somalia, responsibility for theater logistics would remain American. 
Redeployment and force sustainment shipping would still call on Mogadishu well into the 
following year. 
D. REDEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS DURING 
UNOSOM II (4 MAY 1993-31 MARCH 1994) ,.~~:!>'· 
Lieutenant General Bir assumed command ofUNOSOM II forces on 4 May at 1400 
hours local time. Major General Montgomery, Bir's deputy, assumed command of the 5,000 
U.S. troops remaining in Somalia as part of the U.N.'s continuing mission. Logistics 
personnel comprised the majority ofthe U.S. contingent. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 
a mix of 1st Brigade and Tenth Mountain Division soldiers, as well as intelligence personnel 
comprised the remainder of the contingent. [Ref. 8:pp. 64-65] CENTCOM retained 
operational control of U.S. ships in the theater [Ref. 2:p. 59]. 
Throughout May and June, redeployment and sustainment shipping operations 
proceeded at a more leisurely pace. The bulk of U.S. equipment was en route or already back 
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in CONUS. Also, substantial inventories of sustainment supplies remained in the theater. 
[Ref. 12 and 17] Fewer ships were required at this point in the operation. 
From June through most of September, the regional monsoon precluded normal port 
operations. Because of higher than usual wind and seas, only a few ships were moved in the 
Mogadishu port. [Ref. 17] 
With the monsoon came rising native unrest in Mogadishu. The ambush of 5 June 
which left twenty-four Pakistani soldiers dead was the first major clash between occupation 
forces and Somali clansmen. [Ref. 2:p. 20] Yet, port logistical operations were generally 
unaffected by hostilities until autumn when the American Osprey was damaged by hostile 
fire. 
The tanker had been discharging petroleum at Mogadishu since December of 1992 
with only brief intermissions to receive bunkers and more cargo fuel. [Ref. 14] Although 
usually positioned off Green Beach, the ship was moved into the harbor to pump fuel 
pierside. This movement placed the tanker much closer to the scene of previous hostilities --
and in range of Somali rocket-propelled grenade fire. One or two rockets struck the ship 
causing minor damage to deck gear and puncturing two small cargo fuel tanks. 
No crewmen were injured, and because the damaged tanks were virtually empty, no 
fires started. [Ref. 14] Nevertheless, the incident prompted immediate measures to improve 
port security. [Ref. 17] SS Potomac, which relieved American Osprey not too long after the 
incident, was fortunately spared a similar experience. 
Even as Potomac continued to build the theater fuel reserve, UNOSOM II was 
drawing to a humiliating close. The violent exchange between the QRF and Somali militants 
on 3 and 4 October compelled President Clinton to re-evaluate U.S. involvement in Somalia. 
The incident, the bloodiest of any during a U.N. peace-keeping operation, left eighteen 
Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. [Ref. 2:p. 20] The President soon ordered the 
gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the theater, and the seaborne redeployment schedule 
accelerated. 
Ten ships, including four FSSs, backloaded the remaining U.S. equipment and 
vehicles at Mogadishu between early September and late March [Ref. 12]. The last ship 
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departed for CONUS on 25 March 1994 [Ref. 17], six days before the official end of U.S. 
military operations in Somalia [Ref. 2:p. 20]. 
The diplomatic and tactical issues related to the mission's unhappy conclusion often 
overshadow other important aspects of the operation. As the chronology ofMogadishu port 
erations suggests, however, there are equally interesting issues regarding seaborne logistics 
to ponder. The major events relating to sealift operations are shown in Table 5. The 
centrality of maritime operations during the mission warrants closer study of these issues. 















IMEF and CENTCOM staff begin joint planning. 
President orders U.S. forces into Somalia. 
MPF departs Diego Garcia for Mogadishu. 
D-day; SPMAGTF seizes Mogadishu facilities. 
Lummus moors at Mogadishu; MPF offload begins. 
American Osprey arrives off Green Beach. 
Phase I ends. 
American Eagle, first Army sealift ship, arrives at Mogadishu. 
MPF offload concludes. Phase II ends. 
1st FSSG submits backload plan to CJTF. 
Pollux, first FSS, arrives at Mogadishu. 
American Cormorant arrives at Mombasa. 
MARFORP AC backload conference convenes. 
Adm. Perkins departs Mogadishu. CJTF receives backload order. 
MPF backload begins. 3d Bn/9th Marines begin redeployment. 











CJTF receives formal CINCCENT redeployment order. 
JTFSC logistical support period begins. ROWPU barge becomes 
operational at Mogadishu. 
Phase III ends. 
COMPSRON TWO departs Mogadishu. 
Lummus departs Mogadishu; MPF backload concludes. 
UNOSOM II begins. 
QRF engages Somali militants. 
Last U.S. ship departs Mogadishu; seaborne redeployment concludes. 
U.S. military involvement in Somalia ends. 
Table 5 (Continued) 
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III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES SURROUNDING THE CONDUCT OF 
MOGADISHU PORT LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS 
The consensus about the effectiveness of sealift and sustainment operations at 
Mogadishu is (1) they were generally successful, and (2) U.S. forces were fairly well-
prepared to conduct them. As in all military operations of this scale, however, some 
significant problems did arise. This chapter, therefore, explores the major challenges 
confronted by participating MSC decision-makers. Analysis covers the following topics: 
1. Plans and preparation, 
2. Port control, 
3. Sealift, 
4. Sustainment, 
5. Chartering of ships, 
6. Liaisons with government authorities, 
7. Port security. 
Through such analysis, a more detailed assessment of operational effectiveness can be made. 
A. PLANS AND PREPARATION 
The quality of any plan reflects the quantity and accuracy of pertinent data afforded 
the planner. Thus, crisis action plans for the deployment of forces to unfamiliar Somalia 
were destined to have serious limitations. Two reasons apply: (1) the relatively short-fused 
tasking ofCENTCOM and JTF pla.rmers, and (2) the lack ofU.S. military experience in East 
Africa. These handicaps translated into a poorly-developed TPFDD base and scant 
intelligence on conditions at the Mogadishu port. That deployment plans would be frustrated 
by unforseen circumstances and requirements was therefore inevitable despite the planners' 
utmost professionalism. 
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1. Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) Base 
Because a TPFDD specific to Somalia did not exist prior to Operation Restore Hope, 
JTF planners adapted the Gulf War TPFDD for the operation. OPLANS and TPFDD are not 
usually prepared in advance for minor regional contingencies such as the Somalia crisis. 
[Ref. 11 :p. 34] Furthermore, CENTCOM and the JTF had only three or four months to 
prepare for the deployment, and it sometimes requires eighteen months for complete database 
development [Ref. lO:p. 11]. Predictably, the makeshift database caused confusion, 
inefficiency, and delay. 
The problem with the original database, of course, was that it underwent constant 
modification to suit operational realities. Katherine McGrady, a CNA analyst present with 
I MEF in Somalia, stated: 
The entire TPFDD process for the operation was frustrated by the massive 
changes to the database that persisted even after the deployment had begun. 
Some of the changes were understandable. The original TPFDD was based 
on Desert Shield/Desert Storm -- an operation whose mission was vastly 
different than that for Somalia. [Ref. 11 :p. 35] 
As events unfolded and details about mission requirements became apparent, deployment 
planners updated the TPFDD base through WWMCCS. In doing so, they frequently changed 
the units to be deployed, movement dates, numbers of personnel, and the types and numbers 
of equipment to be transported. [Ref. lO:p. 12] 
Frequent alteration of the TPFDD base made timely response by TRANSCOM and 
deploying units exceedingly difficult. Once component commands made changes to the 
database, CENTCOM and JTF planners validated the TPFDD. TRANSCOM, in turn, would 
apply the database to determine transportation requirements and assign assets accordingly. 
CENTCOM and JTF component commanders then notified subordinate units of their 
embarkation point and departure times. [Ref. ll:p. 34] Yet, the TPFDD was typically 
validated for only a short period in the future- perhaps just a few days [Ref. 1 O:p. 12]. This 
complicated transportation arrangements and the embarkation process. 
Complications related to the short planning horizon cost the U.S. unnecessary labor 
and wasted lift. A lead time of three-to-five days was insufficient to properly adapt airlift 
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and sealift scheduling to TPFDD changes. AMC could respond at short notice but only by 
decreasing overall airlift system performance. MSC found much greater difficulty in altering 
a ship's tasking. Consequently, aircraft were dispatched to load cargo that never appeared. 
Army equipment was shipped to Mogadishu and never offloaded. Furthermore, some cargo 
loaded at CONUS ports had to be promptly unloaded because it was later deemed 
unnecessary for use in Somalia. [Ref. 10:pp. 12-13] 
An unstable TPFDD base also caused indecision and delays in the movement of units 
and equipment. U.S. forces arrived in Somalia considerably later than the planned 
deployment timeline indicated (Table 6). The bulk ofMARFOR was to arrive by D+7 and 
ARFOR by D+ 12. By 28 December (D+ 19), the end of Phase II, only seventy-eight percent 
of deploying MARFOR personnel were in the theater. Moreover, only forty-six percent of 
total MARFOR cargo short tons and sixty-one percent of pallets had arrived. The Army 
fared worse on D+ 19; twenty-one percent of total personnel, seventeen percent of cargo short 
tons, and twenty-one percent of the pallets had arrived. An evolving TPFDD in part 
prevented ARFOR from reaching fifty percent oftotal strength until9 January (D+31) for 
personnel and 10 January for cargo. [Ref. ll:p. 33] 
Other factors besides an inadequate database contributed to TPFDD process 
difficulties. First, the ARFOR commander, who was also the Tenth Mountain Division 
commander, was not staffed to operate JOPES/WWMCCS. ARFOR relied on the XVIII 
Airborne Corps, Forces Command, and the JTF Army component, ARCENT, to enter 
division deployment data. Coordination problems inevitably developed. [Ref. IO:p. 15] 
Commands subordinate to ARCENT, having TPFDD "write permission," made unilateral 
changes to the data. Changes to unit types, personnel, equipment, and deployment dates 
undermined ARCENT's meticulous database construction effort. It took weeks for ARCENT 
to make necessary corrections. [Ref. 2:p. 44] 
A second factor was the difference in data units between the services. CENTCOM 







MV Lummus MODLOC off Mogadishu 
Bn (-)of MPF FIE departs CONUS 
)CSE departs CONUS 
)TF HQ (FWD) Departs CONUS 
MARFOR (FWD) Departs CONUS 
)TF HQ (FWD) arrives in AO 
MV Lummus offload commences 
D+2 )CSE arrives in Mogadishu 
MPF FIE Bn (-)(Rein) arrives in Mogadishu 
MARFOR (FWD) arrives in Mogadishu 
D+3 MARFORTAC CP and ADVON arrives in AO 
MPS-2 arrives in AO 
0+5 MARFOR Main Body departs CONUS 
MV Lummus offlcad complete 
MV Bonneyman offload begins 
D+7 MARFOR Main Body arrives in AO 
D+9 MV Bonneyman offload complete 
MV Anderson offload begins 
D+ 10 ARFOR Bn (-) departs CONUS 
D+ 12 ARFOR Bn (-)arrives in AO 
D+ 13 MV Anderson offload complete 
MV Phillips oft1oad begins 
D+ 17 MPS offload complete 
Backload of excess equipment and Class V begins 
D+30 MPF operations complete 
a. Note: CONUS"' Continental U.S.; JCSE =joint Communications Support 
Element; FIE= Fly-In-Echelon; m =Area of Operations; SLRP =Survey, 
liaison, and Reconnaissance Party; TAC CP "'Tactical Command Post; 
ADVON .. Advanced Party. 
Table -6. Proposed Deployment Timeline as of 8 December 1992 [Ref. 11] 
·The Army, on the other hand, organizes TPFDD according to unit identity code (UIC) and 
unit type code (UTC). Data incompatibility thus frustrated deployment planning. [Ref. 2:p. 
47] 
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Another factor was the lack of trained JOPES/WWMCCS operators available to 
support component commands. Poor procedural discipline caused by inexperience and 
infrequent practice was evident during the operation. This resulted in erroneous data entry 
and unnecessary changes. [Ref. IO:p. 15] This factor, in combination with the others, 
sometimes produced extreme TPFDD-related problems. 
One such case involved the Tenth Mountain Division which arrived in Bayonne, its 
port of embarkation, with the wrong equipment. Instead of bringing combat service support 
equipment appropriate for a humanitarian mission, the division brought artillery. The 
TPFDD did not at first reflect the unusual nature of the operation. As a result, the 
embarkation of division equipment was significantly delayed. [Ref. 17] 
Such embarrassing experiences and uncontrolled database changes prompted the 
Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF), Lieutenant General Johnson, to intervene on 4 January 
(D+26). In order to enforce proper TPFDD procedures, the CJTF released a memorandum 
declaring the following: 
1. Without the CJTF's approval, no U.S. unit would be added to the JTF. 
2. There would be no changes in the unit deployment timeline without the 
CJTF's permission. 
3. Without CJTF approval, no ULNs or UICs would be added to a five-day 
validation window. 
The effect of the memorandum, however, was unclear. Only five days later, the CJTF 
announced that the deployment was complete. [Ref. 11 :p. 3 7] 
The frustration, wasted effort, and delays caused by an undisciplined TPFDD process 
are perhaps obscured by the tactical success ofUNITAF in Somalia. Because U.S. forces 
encountered no serious native opposition, a fluid deployment timeline was affordable. After 
all, Phases I and II were completed well ahead of schedule despite deployment delays. The 
cost oftimeline slippage might have been higher, however, had U.S. forces met with early 
resistance and had thus required more resources in the theater. 
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2. Intelligence for Sealift Operations 
Operation Restore Hope was conducted in a nation and region about which military 
planners knew relatively little. MSC had little information about the Mogadishu harbor 
where extensive sealift operations would be conducted. Nevertheless, the MSC headquarters 
staffknew enough about conditions in Mogadishu to plan a detailed survey of the port. They 
also understood that port infrastructure would have to be carried with deploying assets. Yet, 
planners did not entirely appreciate all the implications of the Mogadishu port's extreme 
austerity until the deployment. [Ref. 1 O:p. 5] A shortage of detailed information did cause 
disruptions in the operation. 
Closely monitoring diplomatic events surrounding the Somalia crisis, Vice Admiral 
Kalleres and his staff began to collect intelligence on the Mogadishu port. Three or four 
months before D-day, they began collecting all available published resources on the region 
including charts and port directories. Most of the material was unreliable. According to 
Captain Flood, then assigned to the MSC headquarters staff, "We were able to ascertain that 
the data we had was about three or four years old; we weren't sure what the current 
conditions in that port were." MSC, therefore, had to base initial sealift planning on certain 
hypotheses about the port. 
First, the MSC staff expected that the port could likely accommodate ships with a 
maximum draft of up to thirty-two feet- at least at the seaward berth. The planners knew 
from dated soundings that a ship with a maximum draft of thirty-three or thirty-four feet 
could likely moor at the seaward berth. The harborside berth was probably less deep. They 
also knew, however, that the harbor had deteriorated since the last survey. Approximately 
thirty-two feet, therefore, seemed a reasonable draft limitation. [Ref 17] A Bobo-class MPS 
such as MV Lummus had a maximum draft of twenty-nine feet, and a Hauge-class ship had 
a thirty-three-foot maximum draft [Ref. 15:p. 22]. MSC thus assumed that a MPF ship 
should be able to moor at high tide at the seaward pier [Ref 17]. 
MSC was more wary about mooring an FSS at Mogadishu. The headquarters staff 
convinced Admiral Kalleres that it would be impossible to maneuver an FSS in the port 
without very skilled pilots and tugs. Of course, the port lacked such service. [Ref. 1 7] They 
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warned that a FSS's nearly thirty-five-foot maximum draft and 946-foot length [Ref. 20] 
would make navigation very hazardous in the small port. Nevertheless, the staff took steps 
to minimize the danger. They identified experienced harbor pilots serving in the Navy 
Reserve and chartered four tugs. [Ref. 17] A load limit of 7,000 tons was also imposed on 
the FSSs [Ref. 1 O:p. 5]. With competent pilot and tug service and load restrictions, MSC 
expected to moor an FSS at the seaward berth. 
A third assumption of MSC -- and U.S. military planners in general --was that 
absolutely no host nation support could be expected. They knew that even basic services 
such as water and electrical power would be unavailable. MSC and MARFOR therefore 
planned to deploy everyone and everything required to conduct port operations: tugs, pilots, 
material handling equipment, bulk supplies such as fuel and water, generators, etc. [Ref. 
10:p. 5] 
This valuable assumption, of course, was wholly correct, and the logistical burden 
was not underestimated. In the words of USCINCCENT, General Hoar, "Deploying to 
Somalia was like going to the moon: everything needed had to be brought in or built there." 
[Ref. 21:p. 7] Early deployment ofport infrastructure items saved U.S. forces enormous 
time and inconvenience. Failure to anticipate the extent of this requirement would have 
greatly disrupted the deployment and perhaps jeopardized the operation. 
MSC's assumptions about port accessibility proved mostly correct, but they could not 
of course substitute for detailed intelligence. The FSSs could moor at a seaward berth. 
Because these ships were loaded for a non-combat mission, they were much lighter. Draft 
was never a problem. Both the harborside and seaward berths were accessible to MPF ships 
- at high tide. On one occasion, however, MV Lummus sat on the harbor bottom when the 
tide receded. [Refs. 13 and 14] In briefing Admiral Kalleres upon his return to CONUS, 
Rear Admiral Perkins stated that he wished he had better human intelligence at the port prior 
to the deployment [Ref. 12]. 
However, even after a detailed survey was conducted, conditions in the region were 
still not entirely appreciated. High wind and seas are familiar phenomena off the Somali 
coast. Yet, the full effect of weather on port operations was unanticipated and often 
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underestimated. The vain attempt to moor SS Green Valley at Mogadishu served as an 
example. So too did the aborted efforts by MV American Cormorant and the LASHs to 
conduct in-stream offloads in Somali waters. 
Such oversight caused the delivery of important Army cargo to be delayed. The late 
arrival of the ROWPU barge, also due to high seas, resulted in a theater-wide water shortage. 
Had CENTCOM, the JTF, and the CMPF been more aware of predictable weather conditions 
earlier, alternate transportation might have been arranged for critical cargo. Perhaps some 
of the problems caused by late delivery, such as the water shortage, might have been 
avoided. 
No amount of planning or preparation, however, can completely obviate uncertainty 
in any military operation. Clearly, the TPFDD developmental process and intelligence were 
imperfect during Operation Restore Hope. Problems stemming from these deficiencies 
were, in part, avoidable. Others were not. An unstable deployment database and sparse 
intelligence were largely functions of short-notice planning and an unfamiliar environment. 
The Somalia intervention, after all, was a unique operation; a certain amount of 
improvisation was to be expected. 
B. PORT CONTROL 
Shipping at Mogadishu was remarkably well-managed considering the initial 
condition. of the port infrastructure. In just over a month, U.S. forces converted an 
abandoned facility into a fully-functional, modem seaport. The accomplishment demanded 
experienced seamanship, effective communications, close cooperation among military units, 
and sometimes skillful diplomacy. Above all, effective port control required a strong central 
authority to enforce operational priorities. The harbor pilots, tug and shipmasters, 
COMPSRON TWO, and the CMPF deserve credit for effective port management. 
1. Tug and Pilotage Operations 
Skillful seamanship was vital to the success of port operations if not the expedition 
itself. Captain Flood remarked, "If it had not been for very experienced [pilots] and masters 
... we would have had a lot more trouble." Pilots and masters had to maneuver very large 
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ships in a small, shallow port despite high wind and six-foot swells. For any ship, port entry 
required delicate choreography between the pilot and tugs. Furthermore, ship movements 
were frequent and on a tight schedule. Shiphandlers of lesser experience may not have been 
able to contend with the extreme conditions at the Mogadishu port. Had pilots and masters 
of such quality not been available at Mogadishu, shipping operations might have met with 
delay, damage, and perhaps even disaster. 
Mogadishu tug and pilot services were not, of course, without their limitations. 
Because Mogadishu weather conditions generally worsened as the day progressed, pilots 
were unable to moor or unmoor ships in the afternoon. All ship movements were conducted 
each day during a "morning window." The sea state was so unfavorable during the summer 
monsoon that port traffic came to a virtual standstill. Pilots conducted only a few 
movements between July and September. [Ref. 17] 
Moreover, not all the tugboats were well-suited for ship-handling. Smit-Lloyd 111, 
for example, could not go alongside certain ships, especially FSSs. The large tug's 
superstructure was too high and would contact the hulls of some ships. Smit-Lloyd 111 was 
instead used extensively as a utility tug. The Army tugs discharged from MV American 
Cormorant were of even lesser use to the Mogadishu harbor pilots. The tugs' failure to tow 
the ROWPU barge from Kismayo demonstrated that they were too small for moving ships 
in high seas. Also, the Army tugmasters and crews were inexperienced in ship-maneuvering 
operations. Soon after the tugs arrived from Mombasa in February, they were employed 
mainly for personnel transfers between ships. Only tugs Barbara, Bison II, and Fast Fox 
were used primarily for shiphandling. [Refs. 14 and 17] 
Although no major accidents occurred during any of the hundreds of ship 
movements, there were a few minor incidents. At least two collisions occurred between tugs 
and moored ships. In one such incident, tug Bison II struck MV Hauge in the Mogadishu 
anchorage. The tug was attempting to transfer passengers and, in the process, dented the 
ship's hull. MV.Hauge underwent temporary repair in Mombasa. [Ref. 14] Furthermore, 
an FSS struck the sunken Somali tug at the seaward berth. Buoyant markers placed over the 
wreck disappeared during the summer monsoon. The ship, however, sustained no significant 
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damage. [Ref. 17] These occurrences generated certain inconveniences but did not 
significantly hinder operations. 
Thus, despite minor limitations and setbacks, the Mogadishu tug and pilotage 
services ensured a safe and regular rotation of ships at the port. In doing so, they helped 
maintain a relatively stable flow of cargo and equipment into and out of the theater. 
Successful force deployment and redeployment, therefore, was partly to their credit. 
2. A Port Authority 
Equally important for efficient port operations were the efforts of the local MSC 
commanders, the CMPF and COMPSRON TWO, toward establishing a Mogadishu port 
authority. Over the course of a month, MSC personnel devised procedures and an 
organizational structure for comprehensive port management. Their work culminated in the 
' creation of the MSCO in January of 1993. The office centralized communications between 
local military units, ships, pilots and tugboats, and the MSC chain of command. When 
Captain Allee relieved Admiral Perkins as the CMPF on 15 January, a fully-functional 
MSCO provided an effective means to coordinate port functions. 
The evolution of the MSCO was not without setbacks. Maintaining reliable 
communications with all parties having stakes in port operations was often difficult. 
Communication, of course, was MSCO's central function. To fulfill the function required 
an array of media including satellite telephones and printers, facsimile machines, VHF 
radios, and landlines. Spartan Mogadishu was hardly an ideal place for a comillllftications 
center, and the MSCO staff struggled to keep its equipment operational. 
Just acquiring the communications equipment was frustrating enough. 
Communication with the MSC organization and ships at sea required an International 
Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) unit. A portable unit was air-shipped to Mogadishu from 
MSC, Far East (MSCFE) in Japan, but it was nearly lost en route to MSCO. A detachment 
from U.S.S. Tripoli stationed at the Mogadishu airport inadvertently recovered the unit and 
transferred it to the ship. It took the MSCO staff several days to locate and retrieve the unit 
from a remote space aboard Tripoli. 
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Yet, assembling and getting the unit to function reliably was a greater challenge. 
Unfamiliar with the technology, the MSCO and MPSRON-2 staff spent several days 
installing the satellite dish and related unit equipment. They were only partially successful, 
and the unit worked only intermittently. Finally, a technician from MSCFE was dispatched 
to correct problems with the INMARSAT system. The unit was eventually made to work; 
although, the MSCO staff continued to experience occasional problems in operating the 
system. 
Communication with local units was also often frustrated. The MSCO duty officers 
maintained contact with local shipping using a VHF radio installed at the port administration 
building. Electrical power service in the building was frequently interrupted - thus also radio 
communication. Other MSCO communications, of course, were likewise affected. Power 
came from an Army portable generator which attendants occasionally forgot to refuel. 
Generator maintenance also caused frequent idle periods. Although the MSCO staff could 
alternatively rely on battery-powered VHF handsets, the radios and battery chargers degraded 
over time with frequent use. Consequently, ships at anchor sometimes experienced difficulty 
contacting the MSCO. [Ref. 14] 
Despite limited technical experience and poor accommodations, MSCO did 
ultimately establish reliable communications with its clients. Thus, the CMPF and 
COMPSRON TWO succeeded in creating a competent port authority which greatly 
facilitated Mogadishu shipping operations. When 7th TRANS assumed de jure 
responsibility for port operations on 15 January, the instruments for control were already 
well in place [Ref. 17]. 
3. Shipping Priorities 
Logically, the logistical requirements of forces in the field should have dictated 
transportation priorities at Mogadishu. It follows that the sequence of cargo deliveries and 
equipment backloads should have reflected those priorities. In the first month of port 
operations, MARFOR and the CMPF had little trouble coordinating offloads to meet clear 
JTF needs. By the second month of operations, however, port operations had become more 
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complex and force logistical requirements less certain. The JTFSC, therefore, had to 
establish a system for prioritizing shipping amidst competing demands. 
In December and early January, when Admiral Perkins controlled port operations, 
transportation priorities were rarely in doubt. MARFOR was preoccupied with supplying 
water, fuel, and MREs to the troops in the field. Ships carrying these sustainment supplies, 
therefore, were offloaded first. Whenever conflicts arose over movement priorities, 
MARFOR units were consulted, and the matter was easily resolved. This ad hoc system 
sufficed as long as forces faced critical sustainment item shortages. 
By late January, when the JTFSC assumed most theater logistical responsibilities 
from MARFOR, the situation had changed. Forces in the field no longer faced a severe 
water shortage, and fuel was in abundance. Furthermore, the Mogadishu port was engaged 
in four different shipping activities: the MPF backload, the backload of other forces, 
seaborne force sustainment, and humanitarian relief operations. Pier space and labor was 
limited, so the activities could not occur simultaneously. Yet, whether it was more important 
to receive sustainment cargos before backloading equipment was unclear. More difficult 
conflicts soon arose. A choice among the competing priorities had to be made. [Ref. 11 :p. 
50] 
JTF guidance at that point would have been useful but did not then exist. On 24 
December, shipping priorities were discussed by representatives of the JTF, 1st FSSG 
(Forward), and CMPF who comprised a Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The board, 
however, made few decisions at this meeting. The JTB did address priorities for movements 
to the theater but not within the theater. Also, the board failed to assign anyone 
responsibility for enforcing theater transportation priorities. Isolated parties within the JTF 
staff met informally to discuss the problem, but they could not devise a comprehensive 
stratagem for all transportation assets. Consequently, efforts to resolve the issue languished 
though the following month despite mounting confusion. [Ref. ll:pp. 50-51] 
The JTB felt compelled to finally decide theater transportation priorities on 9 
February. The board established the following hierarchy of cargo preference: 
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1. Force sustainment, 
2. Redeployment items, 
3. Support to coalition forces, 
4. Contractor supplies, and 
5. All other supplies. 
Unlike before, the board widely disseminated their decision in order to effectively enforce 
the priority system. [Ref. 11 :p. 51] 
The slow development of shipping priorities, however, never seriously hampered 
Mogadishu port operations. Moreover, occasional incidents involving tugboats and MSCO 
communications difficulties did not jeopardize control ofthe harbor. In light ofthe port's 
original condition, more problems might have been expected. MSC personnel completed the 
port's impressive transformation before relinquishing control to 7th TRANS on 15 January, 
an accomplishment from which little detracted. 
C. SEALIFT 
Ninety-five percent of all force supply and equipment tonnage delivered and retrieved 
from Somalia went by sea [Ref. 2:p. 47]. The scale of force deployment to the theater was 
only five percent of Operations Desert Shield and Storm [Ref. 1 O:p. xi]. Nevertheless, the 
sealift of military cargo to and from Mogadishu was a daunting task. During fiscal year 
1993, a total561,000 tons of cargo, including 8,757 vehicles and 2.4 million square feet of 
other equipment, were deployed to Somalia aboard MSC ships [Ref. 19:p. 15] Strategic 
sealift assets, of course, transported the lion's share of this cargo. Sealift, then, was a vital 
component in the success of theater logistical operations and thus the entire expedition. 
Given the size and complexity of sealift operations, some problems were bound to 
occur. The undeveloped TPFDD and limited local intelligence no doubt hindered sealift 
operations, causing late ship departures and offload interruptions. Other factors frustrated 
sealift operations as well. However, the MPF offload was not significantly affected by 
planning problems. In fact, maritime prepositioning offset delayed cargo delivery from 
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CONUS and can be credited for an early end to Phases I and II. Furthermore, the backload 
of force equipment from Somalia avoided problems encountered during the deployment. 
Overall, sealift operations were rather well-executed given the unique nature of the mission. 
1. Army Sealift 
The transportation of ARFOR supplies and equipment from CONUS proved the most 
troublesome aspect of sealift operations. The effort was fraught with delays arising from 
several factors. Aside from TPFDD-related difficulties, the four factors contributing most 
significantly to schedule slippage are as follows: 
1. Army sealift ships were in CONUS ports far longer than had been planned. 
Delays in ship departure were attributable to the effects of poor weather on 
cargo loading evolutions. Mechanical failure also postponed cargo shipment 
as was the experience with the crane ship Corpus Christi. 
2. Some ships had to load at several ports. USNS Denebola, for example, 
received cargo at three CONUS ports. Sealift planners assumed that there 
would be sufficient cargo to fill the ships at each port and thus 
underestimated total in-port time. 
3. A propulsion casualty slowed Capella en route from CONUS to Somalia. 
The FSS consequently stopped in Rota, Spain for inspection. For the 
remaining part of the voyage, the ship could make only twelve knots. The 
deployment timeline assumed a 23.5-knot transit for FSSs. 
4. Only one FSS at a time could moor at Mogadishu. The seaward pier could 
accommodate FSSs, but space was limited. Some ships were therefore 
slowed en route to prevent backlogs at the port. 
Chronic shipping delays caused the build-up of Army equipment in theater to proceed much 
more slowly than planned. [Ref. lO:pp. 36-37] Figure 4 illustrates the gap between the 
actual amount of Army cargo delivered to Mogadishu and the sealift capacity that might have 
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Figure 4. Army Sealift Deliveries to Mogadishu [Ref. 10] 
2. MPF Offload 
The offload of the four MPSs at Mogadishu proceeded much more closely to 
schedule. This operation was indirectly affected by TPFDD instability and did encounter 
a few other minor impediments. Short delays, however, did not seriously constrain the build-
up of MARFOR equipment and supplies in Somalia. 
What delays did occur stemmed in part from the late arrival ofMARFOR personnel, 
another consequence of an unstable TPFDD base. Marines of 1st FSSG (Forward) assigned 
to help c::onduct the offload did not arrive in Mogadishu until D+ 2, 11 Decetnber. Further-
more, vehicles and equipment belonging to units not yet in Mogadishu saturated the port 
staging area after Lummus completed its offload on D+6. MV Anderson, the next MPS in 
rotation, was thus unable to discharge cargo until the staging area could be finally cleared 
by arriving MARFOR units. 
Four other factors complicated the efforts of the CMPF and 1st FSSG to offload the 
MPF. 
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1. Some cypes of equipment not needed for the operation were unloaded in order 
to access required cargo. Items useful for MARFOR's humanitarian mission 
were interspersed with combat-related items. An MPS's configuration makes 
for difficult and timeconsuming retrieval of selected cargo. 
2. Derelict Somali lift trucks and other vehicles fouled the staging area. The 
obstacles had to be removed to begin offloading. 
3. Native interlopers occasionally interrupted operations until better security 
could be established. 
4. Communications between the JTF and CMPFwere poor in the _early days of -
the operation. It was therefore initially difficult for the CMPF to anticipate 
unit arrivals and coordinate the offload accordingly. 
The factors did collectively slow progress but not significantly. 
As shown in Table 7, the actual MPF offload dates deviated only slightly from the 
JTF timeline. [Ref. 11 :pp. 39-40] Offload personnel overcame most of their early 
difficulties, and the flow of MPF materials into the theater then quickened. 
Actual Planned 
MPF ship offload dates offload dates 
MV Lummus 12-15 December 1 0-14 December 
MVAnderson 14-1 9 December 18-22 December 
MV Bonneyman 20-23 December 14-1 8 December 
MV Phillips 26-28 December 22-26 December 
Table 7. Planned and Actual MPF Offload Dates iRef. 11) 
3. Maritime Prepositioning 
The deployment of the MPF ships more than compensated for the delay of Army 
sealift assets from CONUS. Anton Jareb, a CNA representative who observed JTF 
operations in Somalia, commented: 
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The contribution of prepositioned supplies to Operation Restore Hope cannot 
be overestimated. The self-sufficient MPF ships were of:floaded in a port 
with practically no infrastructure in a timely manner. This allowed the JTF 
to proceed with a fast pace of operations. [Ref. 9:p. 26] 
According to Jareb, the "real value" of the MPF was that it enabled the rapid accumulation 
ofU.S. forces in Somalia. [Ref. 9:pp. 26-28] The timely build-up of forces, in turn, enabled 
the quick occupation of relief sectors and thus the early completion of Phase II. 
Indeed, for three weeks after D-day, logistical support to U.S. and coalition forces 
came almost entirely from the MPF. Strategic airlift was at first exclusively committed to 
passenger transport, and the first FSS did not arrive in Mogadishu until early January. [Ref. 
9:p. 26] Most importantly, forces initially depended on the MPF ships for bulk fuels and 
potable water. The MPF also provided the only ground transport vehicles early in the 
deployment [Ref. ll:pp. 41-48]. As intended, the MPF provided virtually every item 
required to conduct the operation until other sealift and sustainment assets arrived from 
CONUS and Europe. 
The MPF was never intended to provide support for so many forces so deep in-theater 
for so long. According to Marine Corps doctrine, the 1st FSSG should have been able to 
distribute enough MPF supplies and equipment for 16,500 men within a fifty mile radius for 
no more than thirty days. By D+50, however, the MPF and 1st FSSG were supporting over 
30,000 men, some over 350 miles from Mogadishu. [Refs. 9 and 11] Prepositioned ground 
transportation assets were stretched, and MARFOR eventually had to use aircraft to alleviate 
linehaul shortages in the country [Ref. 11 :p. 48]. 
Nevertheless, the swift expansion of military operations into the Somali interior 
would not have been possible without maritime prepositioning [Ref. 9:p. 25]. The slow 
progress of Army sealift and AMC's early preoccupation with personnel transportation 
underscores the significance of an MPF presence. U.S. tactical efficiency in Somalia and a 
brief Operation Restore Hope are in large part owed to the MPF. 
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4. The Backload 
The backload and redeployment of sealift ships benefitted immensely from lessons 
learned during the deployment-- the significance of a stable TPFDD base in particular. 
When MV Phillips began its backload on 19 January, the JTF had a fully-developed 
redeployment database. Captain Flood clarified the value of this data: 
The impact of having good TPFDD and [thus] a good redeployment schedule 
is that it made [MSC's] sealift planning so much easier .... We basically 
knew which units were going to redeploy and in what time frame - within an 
accuracy of three or four days. [Ref. 1 7] 
The improved TPFDD allowed backload operations to conform much more closely to the 
JTF redeployment timeline. 
For MSC, an accurate database provided an additional advantage: cost savings. The 
command now knew what types and quantities of equipment were to be redeployed and 
when with greater certainty. This facilitated the scheduling ofFSSs and RRF ships already 
in service, and allowed minimal reliance on expensive time charters. If necessary, FSSs and 
RRF ships could be made to wait offMogadishu indefinitely if necessary and, compared to 
time charter ships, at a much lower marginal cost. 
As with all other aspects of the operation, the backload had its setbacks. Unit 
commanders in the field were reluctant to relinquish certain vehicles and equipment. The 
commanders were justifiably concerned about mounting Somali hostilities and did not want 
to jeopardize their units' readiness. Consequently, they retained as much equipment as 
possible until the last minute and then attempted to redeploy everything at once. Of course, 
this practice challenged the JTF timeline and frustrated the Embarkation Control Group. 
Whenever disputes arose over the pace of unit redeployment, the field commanders prevailed 
in the interest of security. [Ref. 1 7] 
Despite the occasional breach of JTFSC/MARFOR redeployment procedures, the 
backload of redeploying sealift ships proceeded much more predictably than the deployment. 
On the balance, the mission in Somalia was well-served by strategic sealift. 
Operation Restore Hope would not have proceeded as quickly had it not been for the self-
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sufficient MPF. The sluggish build-up of ARFOR support equipment resulting from ship 
deployment delays was made far less significant by the immediate availability of 
prepositioned stocks. The fact that only seventeen percent of Army cargo short tons arrived 
in Somalia by 28 December (D+ 19) did not matter all that much; Phase II was already over 
thanks in large part to the MPF. Considering also the efficiency of the backload, sealift 
should be seen as a successful part of the operation. 
D. SUSTAINMENT 
As with sealift operations, the seaborne sustainment of forces in Somalia produced 
both disappointments and successes but ultimately proved adequate to support the mission. 
Sustainment efforts during the early days of the expedition were sometimes strained. 
Unforseen events and underestimated coalition demands initially complicated efforts. 
Nevertheless, sustainment operations improved dramatically by the end of January 1993. 
Forces at first faced shortages of certain commodities, especially water, but later became 
more concerned about controlling surpluses. Although shortages did potentially expose the 
expedition to risk, seaborne logistics did far more to expedite operations than to constrain 
them. 
1. Logistical Support for Coalition Forces 
U.S. commanders in Somalia greatly underestimated the extent to which coalition 
forces would come to rely on U.S. sustainment supplies. As early as D+1, it was apparent 
'":.)...;,)k, 
that many coalition forces were not logistically self-sufficient and that the U.N. was unable 
to assist them. Ironically, the JTF OPLAN tasked its components to "establish accountability 
upon the receipt of allied countries' or host nation's offers of assistance of supplies, vehicles, 
and equipment." Because the CJTF wanted to maximize foreign participation, MARFOR 
and the JTFSC extended common-item, common-user support to coalition units. The 
courtesy, however, significantly burdened early efforts to build adequate supply stocks in 
Somalia. 
Initially, U.S. logistics units and coalition forces arranged support through a pre-
existing cross-service agreement. Later, the JTF provided more specific guidance. U.S. 
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units of the JTF were to .provide support as requested "according to their capability, but not 
to [their] detriment." There were restrictions on certain items: ammunition (Class V), major 
end items (Class VII), and spare parts (Class IX). Class V could not be issued without CJTF 
permission except in emergencies. Only in-theater Class IX and no Class VII were to be 
issued to coalition units. For all items provided, strict accountability was to be maintained 
pending eventual reimbursement by client coalition states. 
In addition to straining force sustainment operations during the first two months of 
Operation Restore Hope, U.S. support of coalition forces bred chronic dependency. The total 
reliance of some foreign units on U.S. logistical support thus complicated the transition to 
UNOSOM II during Phase IV. [Ref. 9:pp. 20-21] 
2. Water 
The Achilles heel of the expedition in arid Somalia might have been a shortage of 
potable water during December and January. Anton Jareb commented: 
The numbers show that there was little margin for safety. That is, because 
water production capability did not allow for the build-up of surplus potable 
water, the JTF was vulnerable during the first period of support. [Ref. 9:p. 
33] 
Because MARFOR lacked sufficient water production and distribution assets, the JTF tapped 
MPF stocks and contracted sources. However, production still fell short of MARFOR 
objectives, and theater water supplies barely maintained pace with rising force demand. Yet, 
minimum force requirements were always satisfied, and, by February, JTF water production 
improved so much as to yield a respectable surplus. [Ref. 9:pp. 31-33] 
The factors which initially made water availability a field commander's top concern 
were (1) the small number of water purification units in the theater, and (2) the concentration 
of those assets in Mogadishu [Ref. 9:p. 33]. There were no uncontaminated water sources 
in Somalia; all water for military consumption was either purified or imported. Forces were 
to rely on field ROWPUs for the bulk of their water supplies. [Ref. 9:p. 29] However, the 
diversion of the MV American Cormorant and the subsequent late arrival of the Army 
ROWPU barge greatly diminished theater water production capacity [Ref. 9:pp. 33-34]. 
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Furthermore, the limited number ofMARFOR ground transportation assets complicated the 
regular delivery of bulk water supplies from Mogadishu to the hinterlands [Ref. 11 :p. 48]. 
ROWPUs used by U.S. forces in Somalia purified salt or brackish water from the 
Indian Ocean, rivers, and eventually from wells and the Mogadishu water supply [Ref. 11 :p. 
45]. MARFOR had several600 GPH units, and the Army had 3,000 GPH ROWPUs in the 
theater. Each type could function for approximately twenty hours in a day and produce an 
average 10,000 and 50,000 gallons per day, respectively. The majority of units were located 
at Green Beach where 1st FSSG (Forward) established a water storage facility. The Green 
Beach water farm was the largest of eighteen storage sites in the theater and could hold 
300,000 gallons. Given force consumption, however, the ROWPUs could not purify enough 
water to come even close to storage capacity. [Ref. 9:pp. 32-33] 
Although DoD grossly overestimated per capita potable water consumption, organic 
MARFOR water production failed to satisfy even the adjusted target. As shown in Table 8, 
the standard DoD multi-service water consumption factors amounted to twenty gallons per 
man per day [Ref. 11 :p. 47] The Gulf War experience, however, demonstrated that the 
figure was inflated. MARFOR therefore used a planning factor of five gallons per man per 
day and set a stock objective of two day's supply at each HRS. The stock objective was 
lower than that for other commodities because potable water became undrinkable after two 
or three days. Nevertheless, during the first period, water production fell short of this 






Food preparation 3.0 
Laundry (6lblma1Vweelc) 2.1 
Medical 
Hospital (65 gaiA>ed) 3.5 
Medical treatment 0.2 
Heat treatment 0.2 
Graves registration 0.2 
Vehicle coolant 0.3 
Construction 1.5 
Water evaporation 1.7 
AIC maintenance 0.2 
Other 1.<4 
Total 20.0 
a. All iddltlc::INJ12.4 pi Ions per man per day required for 
each NBC deconamlnatJon ~tlon. 
Table 8. DoD Multi-Service Water Consumption Factors [Ref. 9] 
To augment water stocks, the JTF and MARFOR depended on the MPF. 
COMPSRON TWO rotated each of the five MPSs at the anchorage off Green B~ where 
the ships discharged water to the 1st FSSG water farm via the AABWS. The MPSRON-2 
staff reported the MPS rotation schedule and discharge figures to the JTF at daily meetings 
convened to discuss logistics concerns. That aMPS be "on the water hook" almost every 
day remained a JTF requirement until late February. [Refs. 11 and 14] In January, MPF 
ships produced 50,000 gallons per day on average [Ref. 11 :p. 34], one third of theater-wide 
daily consumption [Ref. 11 :p. 38]. 
Bottled water further bolstered MARFOR stocks. The JTF contracted for several 
shipments from commercial sources in the region. Some bottles arrived in Mogadishu by 
ship and were later distributed to field units by truck. Other loads were air-shipped directly 
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to remote HRSs each day. Although bottled water was used mostly for drinking, troops in 
the Somali countryside often used it for hygiene as well. The daily planning factor for 
bottled water was three liters per man in Mogadishu and eleven liters in the field. Bottled 
water shipments significantly relieved the strain on purified water stores. [Ref. 11 :p. 34] 
Even still, the JTF was unable to accumulate enough potable water for a sizeable 
reserve until the second logistical support period. Figure 5 illustrates storage trends. Despite 
the infusion of MPF and bottled water, water stocks just barely kept ahead of force 
consumption for the first fifty days of operations [Ref. 9:p. 31]. In February, however, daily 
production increased five-fold to 500,000 GPD, thanks in part to the arrival of the ROWPU 
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Figure 5. Theater Water Production and Force Requirements [Ref. 9] 
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JTF repairs made to wells in the northwestern Mogadishu district of Afgooye in 
January further contributed to the rising inventory [Ref. 9:p. 34]. Well repairs increased the 
flow of water into the Mogadishu reservoir in the northeast part of the city. There ROWPUs 
were connected to the reservoir and a distribution depot established in the vicinity. This· 
water farm greatly facilitated the transportation of water to forces in the interior. Tanker 
trucks could fill-up at this storage site and avoid the circuitous route to and from the 
Mogadishu airport. [Ref. 9:p. 45] 
The contrast in water production capacity between the second and first logistical 
period was striking, but the early potable water "shortage" should be kept in perspective. 
The gap between MARFOR stock objectives and actual storage concerned the JTF for good 
reason. Unforseen events might have transformed the shortage into an operational crisis. 
Having a substantial inventory is insurance against uncertainty in military operations. 
Nevertheless, in-theater water production always met minimum force demand (Figure 5). 
U.S. and coalition troops did not face privation as a result of not meeting the stock 
objectives. 
3. Fuel 
Unlike potable water stocks, there was always more than enough fuel available for 
military units in Somalia by any standard. The MPSs and OPDS tankers supplied enough 
fuel to sustain operations for one hundred days based on average consumption. During the 
first -- and most active -- support period, actual consumption averaged 100,000 gallons per 
day. Peak consumption was 250,000 gallons. Because the humanitarian mission in Somalia 
required few vehicles, including fixed-wing aircraft, fuel stocks were unstrained throughout 
the operation. [Ref. 9:pp. 35-36] 
MARFOR first exclusively relied upon the MPF for JP-5 and MOGAS until 1st 
FSSG (Forward) could establish a fuel farm at Green Beach. The MPSs collectively carried 
approximately five million gallons of JP-5 and a large quantity of MOGAS for coalition 
vehicles. [Ref. 9:p. 35] 
Once the fuel farm became operational in mid-December 1992, the fuel facility 
received bulk fuel mainly from the MSC OPDS tankers via the AABFS. Of a total theater 
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storage capacity of 3 .4 million gallons, the Green Beach fuel farm had three million. The 
storage site became a distribution hub for satellite facilities around the country. [Ref. 9:p. 
36] 
Over the course of Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II, American Osprey and 
SS Potomac together discharged almost 60,000 tons of petroleum at Mogadishu [Ref. 19:p. 
15] This quantity gave the JTF and U.N. forces a comfortable margin of safety in the event 
of crisis. 
4. DryCargo 
Initially, force requirements for dry cargo were grossly overestimated. Theater 
logisticians, therefore, became concerned more about controlling inbound shipments than 
meeting demands during the second support period. 
Force sustainment became a high priority when JTFSC assumed control of logistics 
operations in Somalia in late January 1993. Early force requirement estimates for dry cargo 
such as MREs, spare parts, and construction materials ranged between 500 to 1,000 
containers per week. The JTFSC quickly discovered, however, that theater demand was 
hardly so robust. Typically, sufficient containerized supplies were already available aboard 
ships in the Mogadishu anchorage. In all, sustainment ships delivered perhaps 1 ,000 
containers to the theater during the operation. 
The transshipment of containers at Alexandria as arranged by MSC and MTMC thus 
proved an efficient system for seaborne sustainment. Containerized cargo shipped from 
CONUS could accumulate in Egypt until required by forces in Somalia. Only then would 
SS Gopher State or MV Strong Virginian be dispatched from the theater to retrieve them. 
This system had two advantages: (1) it gave the JTF the means to better control in-theater 
dry cargo inventories, and (2) it spared MSC the added expense of time-chartered shipping. 
Gopher State, a RRF ship, and Strong Virginian, a "prepo," could be detained indefinitely 
at Mogadishu at a negligible marginal cost - unlike a time-chartered vessel. [Ref. 1 7] 
Yet, early forecasts of force dry cargo requirements did result in wasted lift. The 
most notable example was MARFOR's unnecessary employment of MV Maersk 
Constellation. 
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In December of 1992, 1st FSSG started the withdrawal of sixty days of sustainment 
supplies from the Prepositioned War Reserves (PWR) in CONUS for shipment to Somalia 
aboard MV Maersk Constellation. Although the unit intended to use the supplies to sustain 
forces from just D+ 31 until D+60, it withdrew a sixty-day block in order to fill the ship. The 
supplies included MREs, spares, and construction materials. Because 1st FSSG considered 
the items time-critical, it decided not to use the transshipment and shuttle system being 
devised by MSC. Ironically, this alternate arrangement proved far slower. 
To transport, containerize, and load a sixty-day block of supplies, predictably, took 
a long time. It took nearly three weeks just to transport the supplies from several locations 
to a single point of embarkation, Port Hueneme. JTF headquarters further complicated the 
process by unilaterally canceling thirty days of supplies already en route to Port Hueneme. 
By the time the remaining supplies were containerized and loaded, MV Maersk Constellation 
was significantly delayed. 
The ship left on 15 January and arrived in Mogadishu a month later - too late. The 
redeployment of forces had significantly reduced dry cargo requirements, and most of the 
ship's cargo was unneeded. [Ref. 9:pp. 49-50] Countless man-hours and hundreds of barrels 
of fuel were therefore essentially wasted during the two-month-long effort to transport 
MARFOR sustainment supplies to Somalia. 
Despite some obvious inefficiencies, efforts to provide forces with adequate dry 
cargo sustainment must be considered satisfactory. After all, contending with too many 
supplies is much preferred to not enough, especially in military operations. 
E. SHIP CHARTERING 
In assigning ships to support operations in Somalia, MSC used the following policy 
for order of preference: commercial ships already on long-term charter first, most ready 
government-owned ships second, and time charter ships last. The policy reflected both 
strategic and economic concerns. TRANSCOM and MSC desired to reserve some strategic 
sealift assets, namely FSSs and RRF ships, in case of a concurrent military contingency. 
Furthermore, MSC wanted to minimize high-cost time charters in favor of ships already on 
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contract or government-owned. Because activating government ships involved a 
considerable expense as well, the command preferred ships already on contract. When only 
government ships were available, MSC preferred the FSSs to the RRF ships which are more 
costly to activate. MSC's assignment policy attempted to balance the two objectives. 
Consistent with the policy, MSC assigned MV American Eagle and MV American Falcon, 
ships on long-term MSC charter, followed by the FSSs for the sealift of Army equipment. 
[Ref. 10:p. 36] 
Yet, circumstances did arise which forced MSC to depart from policy to some extent. 
The command did have to activate the RRF ship SS Gopher State to replace the crane ship 
Corpus Christi. Furthermore, MSC did reluctantly use time charters in special situations. 
One such case involving the Greek-registered Mediterranean Sky caused MSC considerable 
grief in addition to added expense. 
As UNITAF units began to redeploy in late January, JTF became concerned about 
the prospect of losing passenger aircraft to hostile fire over southern Somalia. This fear 
inspired the idea to transport redeploying personnel by sea from Mogadishu to Mombasa, 
Kenya. There they could be flown in relative safety to CONUS and Europe. To accomplish 
the task, the JTF encouraged MSC to time-charter a passenger ship. MSC responded by 
chartering the liner Mediterranean Sky out of Europe. 
Mediterranean Sky proved to be a bad choice. Soon after embarking two MSC 
representatives, it was discovered that the ship was in very poor condition. Furthermore, as 
is typical of many Mediterranean liners, the ship lacked an evaporator and could not produce 
water. On at least one occasion in Mogadishu, a ROWPU had to be aligned to the ship to 
fill its potable water tanks. The ship was altogether inadequate as a troop shuttle. [Ref. 17] 
Another incident involved a ship time-chartered to transport bottled water from the 
Middle East. Because of improper stowage, a large percentage of the bottles lay crushed in 
the hold upon the ship's arrival in Mogadishu. [Ref. 14] 
The employment of time-chartered ships was nevertheless the exception to the rule. 
MSC adhered to its chartering policy to the maximum extent possible thereby avoiding 
unnecessary expenses, unpleasant surprises, and overextension of its strategic assets. 
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F. LIAISON WITH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
Failure to properly deal with U.S. and foreign government agencies sometimes 
caused unnecessary inconvenience in the conduct of maritime operations. In one case, a 
breach of protocol resulted in the diversion of a ship and the lengthy postponement of its 
offload of important cargo. 
That particular case involved the SS Green Valley which unsuccessfully attempted 
to gain port clearance at Mombasa. The Kenyan port authorities ostensibly denied entry 
because of the ship's length. They claimed that the ship would be unable to safely moor or 
offload ammunition barges in the small harbor. The more likely reason was that U.S. 
representatives mishandled the various formalities expected by Kenyan officials. After all, 
MV American Cormorant was able to later enter Mombasa and discharge lighterage without 
objection from the Kenyans. In the words of Captain Flood, "We probably didn't grease the 
skids right." [Ref. 1 7] 
Another incident occurred during the initial stages of the deployment at Diego 
Garcia, a British Indian Ocean Territory. Marines constituting the MPF OPPs arrived at the 
island's airport with firearms without having been granted a waiver. The commander of the 
U.S. naval installation at Diego Garcia detained the parties at the airport for the customs 
violation. They were very nearly expelled from the island and might have been prevented 
from joining the MPF. Fortunately, the base commander and British authorities relented. 
[Ref. 14] 
A third incident involved the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) during the redeployment of 
MPF ships back to CONUS. During the backload, the ships' masters and Marine stevedores 
were to coordinate efforts to identifY hazardous materials stowed aboard the MPSs. The type 
and quantity of these materials were to be properly recorded on a Dangerous Cargo Manifest 
for presentation to the USCG. Because of a tight backload schedule and security concerns 
at the port, MPF masters were under pressure to quickly complete the backload. In their 
haste, masters and stevedores sometimes omitted or incorrectly documented items on the 
manifest. When two MPF ships returned to CONUS, the USCG discovered several 
discrepancies with the manifest for which they cited the masters. [Ref. 22] 
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Yet, military leaders were generally quite sensitive to the requirements of 
government agencies during the operation. For example, MARFORPAC urged the 
establishment of washdown sites for redeploying vehicles and equipment to successfully 
satisfy Department of Agriculture standards. Examples of similar foresight with respect tG 
liaison with authorities abounded during the operation. Occasionally, however, ignorance 
of customs regulations, documentation requirements, or other procedural formalities caused 
inconvenience and sometimes operational disruptions. 
G. PORT SECURITY 
Protection of the port from Somali thieves, refugees, and combatants was a persistent 
concern for the CMPF, 7th TRANS, and UNOSOM commanders. Each took steps to secure 
the port perimeter against intruders, but several incidents nevertheless occurred. Although 
none were very serious, the possibility of sustaining personnel casualties and more 
significant damage to ships or equipment certainly existed. Whether port security was 
sufficient to withstand more concerted native incursions was not tested and cannot be known. 
According to doctrine, MPF operations were to occur in a "benign" environment -
unlike the Mogadishu port. During the offload, explosions and small arms fire could be 
heard in the vicinity of the port. Coalition security forces discovered Somali ammunition in 
the port compound. [Ref. 8 p. 29] Natives often breached the compound's wall of containers 
to steal items from vehicles staged on the harborside pier [Ref. 14]. Intruders even briefly 
interrupted offload operations on a few occasions [Ref. 11 :p. 39]. It took several days for 
the SPMAGTF to fully control the interlopers [Ref. 8:pp. 38-40]. Even still, the port was 
never made invulnerable. 
The small arms attack on the compound on 23 February 1993 demonstrated that the 
port could be a target for Somali militants. Fortunately, only minor injuries were sustained 
and MV Bonnyman, then pierside, was undamaged. [Ref. 14] The attack did, however, 
hasten the backload ofMPF ships [Ref. 22]. 
There was also the problem of stowaways. Although marines were posted at the 
ramps of all pierside MPF ships,_ three Somali adolescents managed to get aboard MV 
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Anderson during the ship's backload. When the ship's crew discovered the stowaways, 
Anderson was already en route to Diego Garcia. Because the British representative would 
not receive the Somalis at Diego Garcia, the ship was forced to return to Mogadishu to 
deliver its unwelcome passengers. The security failure cost the ship several days transit 
time -- and thus a few hundred barrels of fuel. [Ref. 14] 
The most notable security-related incident involved the SS American Osprey which 
was struck by rocket-propelled grenades at the pier. The damage to deck equipment and 
cargo fuel tanks did not endanger the ship nor interrupt its operations. Had the projectile 
landed elsewhere on the ship, however, injury to personnel or fire might have resulted. 
Fortunately, the ship merely required a brief period in a shipyard to effect repairs. [Ref. 14] 
Although MSC applied some pressure to ensure improved security for its ships, it was 
generally satisfied by the measures taken during UNOSOM II [Ref. 17] 
Port security was probably adequate to meet the threats encountered during the 
several months of operations. That no particularly serious incident occurred seems proof 
enough. Operations concluded with no loss of life and only minor property loss and damage. 
However, some of the incidents might have been avoided with tighter measures. 
Furthermore, the ability of Mogadishu port security to counter a more significant threat 
remains uncertain. 
The analysis of port security and other issues supports the overall evaluation of 
Mogadishu maritime operations as follows: 
1. Operations were always successful in terms of broad mission objectives and 
mostly successful in meeting planned logistical timelines and other goals. 
2. U.S. logistics units were well-prepared to support the operation despite short-
notice planning and an unfamiliar environment. This was in large part thanks 
to the MPF. 
3. Most importantly, logistics and transportation managers were able to quickly 
adapt to theater realities and resolve most problems encountered. 
The speed at which U.S. forces completed the occupation and pacification of Somalia could 
not have been possible without highly effective sealift and sustainment operations. However, 
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as in all major military operations, there are some aspects to emulate and others to avoid. 
These are discussed in the next chapter. 
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IV. LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Based on the issues explored previously, this chapter identifies important lessons 
learned from the conduct of maritime logistics operations at Mogadishu. The chapter 
furthermore offers recommendations for improving sealift and seaborne sustainment 
operations of this kind in the future. 
A. ELEVEN IMPORTANT LESSONS 
The eleven major lessons learned and corresponding suggestions which follow are 
derived from the successes and failures of operations at Mogadishu. 
1. Efficient Movement of Forces Requires a Stable, Well-Developed 
TPFDDBase 
As experienced during the early stages of Operation Restore Hope, a deployment 
database not tailored for a specific operation may cause serious disruptions. In order to 
correct a deficient database to reflect operational realities, significant modifications must be 
made quickly. If improperly managed, however, the process could generate unnecessary 
database changes and frequent errors. As experienced during the early days of Operation 
Restore Hope, a unstable TPFDD causes confusion, delays, unnecessary labor, and 
sometimes wasted sealift. 
The best way to avoid these problems, of course, is to prepare a TPFDD base for a 
certain contingency in advance of deployment operations. As with the Somali£r·Ciisis, this 
is not always possible nor practical. If a tailored database is unavailable, however, the 
following measures can be taken to control the development process: 
1. Establish a comprehensive policy for authorizing database entries applicable 
to the entire chain of command from the CINC down. 
2. Implement procedures for coordinating the efforts of units with "write 
permission when the authority to make database changes is decentralized. 
3. Train JOPES/WWMCCS operators extensively. 
4. Rigorously enforce JOPES/WWMCCS procedural discipline 
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These actions would control the degree to which the authority to make database changes is 
centralized. They would furthermore encourage cooperation between units with "write 
authority" and reduce errors and unnecessary changes. 
2. Detailed Intelligence Needed for Sealift Operations in Some Locations 
Cannot Be Found on the Bookshelf 
Information helpful in conducting shipping operations at Third World ports may be 
dated, sparse, or just plain wrong. This was often the experience during the deployment to 
Mogadishu. Publications written about locations where there has been limited U.S. military 
experience may be unreliable. Even when reliable information is available, important facts 
might be omitted, overlooked, or unappreciated. The likely impact of prevailing weather 
conditions off Somalia, for example, was underestimated until the SS Green Valley incident. 
Inadequate information about port depth, channel obstructions, or unique port features and 
conditions could easily disrupt operations and even cause disaster. 
Having human intelligence sources at the offload port well before the deployment 
would greatly facilitate planning for sealift operations. The following steps can be taken in 
this regard: 
1. Wherever possible. collect information from credible local officials, port 
administrators, harbormasters, tug and shipmasters, and pilots familiar with 
the port. 
2.' When local expertise is unavailable, as in Mogadishu, dispatch a Survey. 
Liaison and Reconnaissance Party (SLRP) as early as possible to gather 
intelligence. 
Of course, any SLRP or group of local informants should include experienced ship handlers 
and port authorities. 
Regardless of the quality of port information, planners should also be aware of the 
sealift assets available for use in austere ports. If port access by MPF ships or FSSs is 
thought to be hazardous, the RRF has ships which may be more suitable. Conveniently-sized 
ships of lesser draft can be activated as substitutes for the standard assets in such situations. 
[Ref. 17] 
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3. Military Planners Should Expect to Deploy Everything Needed to 
Support Operation 
Especially in Third World ports, U.S. forces cannot anticipate host nation support. 
Although Mogadishu may be an extreme case, expecting to encounter modem facilities 
would be folly. Port infrastructure is likely to be inadequate or nonexistent. Consequently, 
planners must be prepared to provide all vehicles, equipment, supplies, and, most 
importantly, expertise necessary to rebuild port infrastructure and reestablish services. 
4. Safe and Efficient Sealift and Sustainment Operations Depend on the 
Rapid Establishment of a Competent Port Authority 
As seen in Mogadishu, the timely establishment of effective tug, pilotage, and port 
control services avoids confusion, delay, and possibly disaster. Having pro-active MSC 
commanders like the CMPF and COMPSRON TWO as well as experienced mariners greatly 
facilitates the effort. Another important element is reliable communications between port 
service personnel and their clients. Furthermore, a system for resolving conflicts among 
competing port activities is also a key factor in successful port management. 
In light of these factors, four specific measures for establishing a more effective port 
authority are as follows: 
1. Maintain a dossier containing names of experienced harbor pilots. harbor-
masters. and tug operating companies for quick recall. The U.S. Navy 
Reserve can provides quality pilots and skilled port control personnel. 
2. Assign a flag officer to direct port opening operations. The presence of 
Admiral Perkins in Mogadishu ensured that port interests were duly 
represented in the JTF. According to the admiral, "A flag officer [is needed] 
to say, 'No."' [Ref. 12] 
3. Preposition all communications equipment required for a MSCO with the 
MPF. MSC is already considering the concept of a deployable "MSCO van" 
which would contain all materials necessary to make the office self-sufficient 
including generators, lighting, furniture, and even office supplies. The 
container could be made almost immediately operational upon being 
offloaded at a port. [Ref. 22] 
4. Establish a clear policy for pnonttzmg ship movements early and 
periodically review the policy throughout the operation. A Joint 
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Transportation Board should thus meet regularly to affirm and adjust 
priorities. Such a measure keeps port activity in line with operational 
requirements and helps avoid conflicts. 
Together, these measures would save considerable time and effort in developing port services 
and a control organization. 
5. The MPF Is an Invaluable Asset 
Large-scale expeditions such as in Somalia require immediate availability of mass 
quantities of supplies. The MPF satisfies this requirement and thus allows the rapid 
accumulation of forces in the theater. 
It is difficult to conceive how the early military operati9ns in Somalia could have 
been sustained without the MPF presence. In the first three weeks of openi.tions, the MPF 
was the nearly exclusive source of fuel, transportation equipment and MREs, and a vital 
back-up source ofwater. The delay in the arrival of Army sealift ships and the insufficient 
number ROWPUs in Somalia further increased total force reliance on the MPF. 
Strategists and logisticians, therefore, should not discount the importance of the MPF 
in future operations. The MPF's absence would likely slow the pace of operations and 
possibly put forces at risk, at least until other sealift assets arrived from CONUS. 
6. Logistics Planners Should Expect to Provide Substantial Support to 
Coalition Forces 
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II demonstrated that forces participating in 
multinational operations are not necessarily self-sufficient. Furthermore, the U.N. is not 
always prepared to assist them. The onus therefore falls upon U.S. forces to provide 
common-item, common-user support upon request of coalition units. Logisticians must 
therefore consider the requirements of coalition units in scheduling sustainment shipping and 
setting stock objectives. 
7. Timely Deployment of Water Production Units Must Be a High Priority 
Failure to deploy a sufficient number ofROWPUs in the theater may cause water 
shortages and subsequent force vulnerability. Although the MPF and contracted sources can 
supplement water stocks considerably, the supply is not likely to meet precautionary stock 
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objectives for a large force. Such was the experience during the first two months of 
Operation Restore Hope. Logistics planners ought to take special caution to ensure 
ROWPUs can be offloaded easily and early in the deployment. 
8. Establishing a Container Transshipment Service in Lieu of Direct Liner 
Service May Best Serve Dry Sustainment Cargo Requirements 
The container transshipment and shuttle system used to transport sustainment 
supplies to Mogadishu worked very well. SS Gopher State, MV Strong Virginian, and the 
Alexandria transshipment site provided the JTF greater flexibility to control sustainment 
supply inventories. It also saved MSC the relatively high cost of time charters. A similar 
system should be considered for use in future operations instead of direct liner or time-
charter service. 
9. Time-Chartered Ships Require Close Inspection 
The capabilities and limitations of ships should be known prior to making any time 
charter commitment. The case of the Mediterranean Sky underscores this point. Based upon 
this incident and others, a few minimum requirements for time-chartered ships ought to be: 
(1) functional evaporators, (2) acceptable basic accommodations and sanitary conditions for 
passengers, and (3) suitable means for proper cargo handling and stowage. This may seem 
like common sense, but deficiencies are still overlooked. Closer investigation may avoid 
later surprises. 
1 0~ Sensitivity to the Requirements of Government Agencies Saves Time and 
Inconvenience 
Failure of U.S. forces to anticipate and observe certain government requirements can 
cause inconvenience and possibly disrupt operations. The following are recommendations 
for avoiding trouble with foreign and U.S. government agencies: 
1. Be familiar with procedural formalities required by port authorities. 
2. Be aware of customs restrictions affecting personnel in transit to the theater. 
Obtain all necessary waivers in advance. 
3. Anticipate Department of Agriculture standards and take appropriate steps 
while re-embarking vehicles and equipment on redeploying ships. This 
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usually entails the establishment of washdown sites and inspection stations 
at the equipment staging areas. 
4. Encourage closer cooperation between shipmasters and stevedores while 
preparing the Dangerous Cargo Manifest. This precaution will prevent 
unnecessary friction with USCG inspectors upon a ship's return to CONUS. 
Paying greater attention to these minor details may preclude major annoyance in the future. 
11. Port Security Is an Important Consideration Even in a "Secure" 
Environment 
Security for ships, personnel, and equipment is a likely concern during operations of 
the sort conducted in Somalia. Even at well-defended facilities, incidents can still occur. 
Port personnel and ship crews cannot assume that they are safe from thieves, stowaways and 
combatants. 
Such was the experience at Mogadishu. There were no significant casualties 
sustained at the port during the operation, but more serious incidents might have easily 
occurred. That rocket-propelled grenades caused such little damage toSS American Osprey 
is indeed fortunate given the ship's petroleum cargo. 
In light of incidents in Mogadishu, the following precautions may improve security 
while conducting shipping operations at some Third World ports in the future: 
1. Encourage greater vigilance among stevadores and ship crewmen, and, if 
possible, post more sentries to deter stowaways. 
2. Assign more patrols to cargo staging areas to guard vehicles and equipment 
from pilferers. 
3. Arrange special security for ships moored close to the scene of hostilities. 
For example issue flack jackets to crewmen [Ref. 14] and position armored 
vehicles nearby [Ref. 1 7]. 
As in Somalia, it is important for MSC to take an active role in assuring that ships receive 
adequate attention from security forces assigned to the port. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
History, of course, is valuable only to the extent that it can be applied in the present 
to benefit the future. It is hoped, therefore, that military strategists and logisticians will heed 
the lessons learned from maritime operations at Mogadishu to avoid mistakes and repeat 
successes. Indeed, the opportunities to apply these lessons are likely to be more common. 
One need only look to recent events in the Caribbean to recognize the significance of the 
Mogadishu experience. It remains a convenient model for conducting effective sealift and 
force sustainment operations in a remote, austere environment. 
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